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FEDERALISM HEDGING, ENTRENCHMENT, AND THE
CLIMATE CHALLENGE
WILLIAM W. BUZBEE*
The virtues and effects of federalism continue to generate political, judicial
and scholarly ferment. While some federalism partisans champion
exclusivity and separation, others praise the more common political choice
to retain federal and state regulatory overlap and interaction. Much of this
work, however, focuses on government learning or rule clarity, giving little
or no attention to how different federalism choices can heighten or hedge
risks of regulatory failure and policy reversal. These debates play out with
unusual fervor and with high stakes in battles over climate change
regulation. Despite broad agreement that any effective climate policy
intervention must include national action, disagreement reigns regarding the
retention of state authority. Prominent policymakers, industry voices, and
scholars have championed a single regulator and clean authority delineation
as the answer to the challenges of climate change. They characterize state
climate policies as a weak or even harmful alternative, especially if
overlapping or intertwined with a federal role. A global challenge like
climate change does intuitively seem to be a quintessential setting for a
single, comprehensive regulator, especially if addressed through marketutilizing regulation. This intuition, however, only makes sense under an
idealized view of politics and regulatory efficacy. This Article introduces
the concept of federalism hedging—namely retention of concurrent federal
and state authority due to its benefits and especially protective effects, even
in an area ideally regulated by a single national regulator— then
disaggregates sometimes blurred but related strains in federalism analysis. It
illuminates federalism hedging dynamics through a theoretical and historical
case study of climate regulation and federalism choice. This Article argues
that where effective regulation is dependent on innovations and applies in
areas characterized by rapid change in regulatory design, markets, and
technology, such regulatory design choices—especially regarding federalism
allocations of authority—should not be based on optimistic assumptions of

*
This Article builds on presentations and discussions at a Yale Law
School-Unitar Conference on Climate Change Governance, Strengthening Institutions to
Address Climate Change and Advance a Green Economy, and in related papers
presented at George Washington, Vanderbilt, UCLA, and University of Minnesota law
schools, as well as linked conference and roundtable presentations at the American
Association of Law Schools, Center for Progressive Reform, Nova Law School, and
the Center on Federalism and Intersystemic Governance (CFIG) at Emory University
School of Law. A book chapter entitled Climate Federalism, Regulatory Failure and
Reversal Risks, and Entrenching Innovation Incentives, in THE LAW AND POLICY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM (Kalyani Robbins ed., 2015) contains related but
narrower analysis. The author is indebted to colleagues Vicki Arroyo, Gabriel
Pacyniak, and Kate Zyla at Georgetown’s Climate Center for innumerable discussions
and meetings at which these issues were explored. He also thanks research assistants
Ryan Drobek, Daniel Gick, Alayna Lewis, and Dana Lyons, and Than Nguyen and
Andrea Muto of Georgetown University Law Center’s library for their assistance.
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steady progress and easy implementation. Effective regulatory structures
should hedge risks, with special attention to linked political and economic
dynamics. Regulation that retains room for both federal and state
involvement and overlap can provide room for regulatory learning and
adjustment, catalyze commitment and corrective efforts, while still fostering
beneficial regulatory and market entrenchment and resulting stability
through a web of similarly directed regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Advocating a new body of regulation with the explicit concession
of likely error and risks of regulatory derailment may seem selfdefeating. Nevertheless, effective regulatory design, like effective
investment strategies, must be designed for success yet anticipate
unfavorable developments and error risks.1 And in the United States,
due to our constitutional structures and linked political norms, any
major regulatory choice must include decisions about how to utilize the
regulatory roles demarked by federalism. What roles should be
allocated to or preserved for federal, state, and local actors, or perhaps
a combination of them all? Climate change policy choices remain the
subject of partisan and rancorous contestation, including disputes over
the right federalism choice. By leavening idealized policy solutions with
attention to political and legal discord and regulation-market linkages,
this Article illuminates the effects and dynamics of federalism hedging,
a largely overlooked value of federalism structures retaining concurrent
and often interacting federal and state roles. Federalism hedging refers
to the regulatory choice to retain overlapping, interacting, and often
intertwined federal and state roles even in a setting where the
apparently ideal regulatory regime would rely on exclusive federal
regulation that would preempt state roles.
This Article argues that both federalism discourse and climate
change policy debates have failed to analyze adequately how choices
about federal and state roles can serve to hedge and even reduce risks
of regulatory reversal and implementation failure. This Article’s
analysis of federalism hedging operates at three levels. First, it
introduces federalism hedging as a theory, explaining the attributes and
dynamics of federalism hedging and situating it within recent scholarly
and policy debates about the values and functioning of federalism.
Second, it then illuminates federalism hedging with analysis of the
regulatory challenges posed by climate change and the history of
climate and clean energy progress and contestation. And, third,
drawing on this theoretical and historical analysis, the Article makes a
normative and prescriptive claim that retaining latitude for state and
federal overlap can provide an array of benefits and, especially, reduce
1.
See, e.g., Thomas J. Brennan & Andrew W. Lo, Dynamic Loss
Probabilities and Implications for Financial Regulation, 31 YALE. J. ON REG. 667
(2014) (analyzing the need for “adaptive” regulation due to how risks to financial
institutions’ assets will vary over time and pose risk of amplifying losses); Anne Joseph
O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing
Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655 (2006) (analyzing the challenge
of protecting national security while maintaining democratic values and assessing linked
choices of redundancy, oversight and centralization to address attendant risks).
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risks of disruptive policy reversals that could, in turn, undercut linked
markets and regulatory progress.
Such a hedging role is of especial importance where a body of
regulation provides a crucial underpinning of a market and that market
is itself essential to regulatory success. Retaining latitude for both
federal and state roles also can serve in a valuable precautionary role
conducive both to innovation and pragmatic adjustment in regulatory
settings characterized by rapid change in business models and
technology.2
This Article, like much federalism discourse, is actually not about
what is constitutionally required. Instead, the Article builds on an
increasingly robust body of scholarship analyzing how federal and state
roles recognized by the Constitution should be utilized to further
particular regulatory policy goals or political ends.3 Although
federalism scholars often mention the benefits of federalism
“redundancy” in risk regulation and benefits of dynamic
interjurisdictional learning, little of this pro-overlap and interaction
federalism literature devotes attention to the regulation-business link,
regulatory risks of error, implementation failures, and political reversal
risks.4 Another strain of federalism scholarship documents and analyzes

2.
Sarah E. Light, Precautionary Federalism and the Sharing Economy, 66
EMORY L.J. 333 (2017) (discussing a case study of “sharing economy” developments
and rapid innovation; identifying benefits of retaining multiple regulatory voices and
not enacting preemptive law; and noting “time-bound” contingency of regulators’
roles).
3.
See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk,
Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007)
[hereinafter Asymmetrical Regulation] (identifying regulatory policy benefits of
regulatory floors); William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108 (2005) [hereinafter Contextual Environmental Federalism]
(tracing federal and state interactions that sequentially have shaped environmental
policy); Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933 (2008)
(focusing on the implications of prevalent intersections of federalism, preemption and
administrative law); Heather Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An
Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889 (2014) (reviewing scholarship that identifies benefits to
national aspirations and political identity due to interacting and shared federal and state
turfs); Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534,
541–43 (2011) (discussing centrality of statutory federalism allocations rather than
constitutional lines); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57
DUKE L.J. 2023, 2026–29 (2008) (analyzing how federalism choices and battles are
increasingly sorted out and contested in areas shaped by administrative law).
4.
A few articles regarding climate federalism identify and analyze
implications of regulatory risks and are cited further below. See Alice Kaswan, The
Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: What Role for Federal, State, and Local
Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 67, 69 (2007); Jared Snyder & Jonathan
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the logic and legality of state and local climate and clean energy
initiatives undertaken without a broader national agreement.5
Binder, The Changing Climate of Cooperative Federalism: The Dynamic Role of the
States in a National Strategy to Combat Climate Change, 27 J. ENVTL. L. 231, 232–33
(2009).
5.
See, e.g., David Adelman & Kirsten Engel, Adaptive Environmental
Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE:
THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF
FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 277, 296–98 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009)
(identifying the benefits of adaptive regulation and championing non-preemptive
regulation generally and through climate change case study); William L. Andreen,
Federal Climate Change Legislation and Preemption, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y
J. 261, 268–69 (2008) (arguing in favor of federal floor preemption for climate
legislation); Eric Biber, Cultivating a Green Political Landscape: Lessons for Climate
Change Policy from the Defeat of California’s Proposition 23, 66 VAND. L. REV. 399,
403 (2013) (analyzing federal climate legislation defeat and contemporaneous defeat of
a bill that would have repealed California’s climate regulation); Rachel Brewster,
Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and National Climate Change
Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 245–50 (2010) (exploring the benefits and
drawbacks of incremental climate policy); Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 3, at
1616–19 (an article analyzing implications of choices to preempt with regulatory floors
or ceilings, exploring climate regulation choices); William W. Buzbee, State
Greenhouse Gas Regulation, Federal Climate Change Legislation, and the Preemption
Sword, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 23, 25–26 (2009) (exploring the risks of
preemption of state climate regulation authority); Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective
Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and Complementary Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEG.
207, 210–11 (2012) [hereinafter Designing Effective Climate Policy] (analyzing costs
and benefits of “complementary” traditional regulatory approaches and market-based
mechanisms); Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 283, 285 (2003) [hereinafter Federalism,
Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions] (discussing relationship between
California climate legislation and federal law); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism
and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (2009) [hereinafter Iterative
Federalism and Climate Change] (discussing “iterative federalism” benefits of statutes
that “designate[] a particular and distinct state or group of states to regulate and rel[y]
on that regulatory arrangement to enhance compliance with federal standards.”);
Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is Motivating State
and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About
Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. L. 1015, 1015–16 (2006) (exploring
alleged irrationality of, and the possible justifications for, state and local measures to
mitigate a global challenge); Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective
Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The
Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579 (2008) (exploring why
ceiling preemption of state restrictions on GHG emissions is not justified by the
principal justifications for federal environmental regulation); Alice Kaswan, A
Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate Change Legislation: The Value of State
Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 791 (2008) (advocating
cooperative federalism strategies to address climate change, including federal minimum
standards and goal setting, but minimizing preemption through a waiver system to
foster state-level innovation); Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a Nation
State, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1621 (2008) (discussing California’s climate leadership in
climate policy and unconstitutionality risks of the state’s deliberately extrajurisdictional
focus); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation:
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Before comprehensive federal climate legislative proposals went
down to defeat in 2009 and 2010, they spurred an important but
truncated debate over what roles should be retained by states if the
nation enacted a climate-focused federal cap-and-trade bill.6 Prominent
scholars and stakeholders argued that because climate regulation
addresses a global ill and logically must embrace market-based
regulatory tools—most likely cap-and-trade-based regulation or use of
pollution taxes—regulation should be structured to draw on the largest
markets possible in order to facilitate the business search for costeffective means to reduce emissions.7 They often championed
preemption of state climate roles. Final (but unsuccessful) bills,
however, rejected such calls.8 And a recent 2017 proposal by leading
Republican conservatives advocated enactment of a carbon tax regime,
but coupled that proposal with a call for the elimination of other
similarly targeted federal or state laws.9
In the absence of a tailored federal climate law, states nonetheless
have made climate and clean energy regulatory progress and, as
litigants, prompted a series of federal regulatory actions to address
climate risks under the Clean Air Act and federal energy laws. And
those federal regulatory interventions, especially the Clean Power Plan
(CPP) targeting existing power plants’ greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, were shaped by state experiences, sought to harness state

Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681 (2008) (acknowledging
advantages in principle of a unitary approach but ultimately recommending
“a plural model”); Vivian E. Thomson & Vicki Arroyo, Upside Down Cooperative
Federalism: Climate Change Policymaking and the States, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2011)
(assessing political and economic circumstances influencing state-level climate change
policymaking); Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the
Potential for Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669 (2010)
(exploring counterintuitive local climate efforts and how they augment national efforts);
Michael P. Vandenbergh & Mark A. Cohen, Climate Change Governance: Boundaries
and Leakage, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 221 (2010) (describing mechanisms to create
incentives for major developing countries to reduce emissions).
6.
For an early review of the merits of a unitary or “plural” regulatory
answer, ultimately arguing for retention of latitude for state climate regulation alongside
a future federal climate law, see Stewart, supra note 5, at 707.
7.
See infra notes 111–33 and accompanying text (discussing arguments for
preemptive federal climate law).
8.
See infra notes 160–79 and accompanying text (discussing climate bills’
federalism choices and final bills’ rejection of a comprehensively preemptive bill).
9.
See infra notes 114–16 and accompanying text (discussing these
proposals).
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regulatory capacity and creativity, and preserved state authority to do
more.10
The role of federalism overlap and interaction as a hedge,
especially in the climate regulation arena, is a subject of more than just
theoretical interest. As this Article goes to press, the new
administration of President Donald Trump has overtly declared plans to
revisit and roll back climate progress.11 The extent to which this new
administration can do so is substantially shaped by federal, state and
business climate and clean energy progress, and past statutory
federalism choices.
This Article agrees that the ideal answer to a global challenge like
climate change would be regulation at the largest scale possible, with
minimized regulatory overlap. Nonetheless, mandating such authority
allocations would be the wrong answer. The effects and political
economic dynamics of federalism hedging analyzed in this Article
reveal why. The value of federalism hedging links to likely regulatory
implementation failures, regulatory reversal risks, and risks of
unsettling linked markets. Responses to regulation will inevitably be
10.
See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662–64 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter CPP].
11.
President Trump by executive order sought to hasten such change. Exec.
Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,095 (Mar. 31, 2017) (directing EPA to
“suspend, revise, or rescind” the Clean Power Plan). The EPA has started down this
path, withdrawing proposed rules that were the next steps in implementing the Clean
Power Plan. Withdrawal of Proposed Rules: Federal Plan Requirements for
Greenhouse Gas Emission from Electric Utility Generating Units Constructed on or
Before January 8, 2014; Model Trading Rules; Amendments to Framework
Regulations; and Clean Energy Incentive Program Design Details, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,144
(Apr. 3, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). The CPP repeal proposal is quite
minimal in its engagement with the CPP’s extensive documentation, legal analysis, and
review of clean energy trends and state level regulation built on in the CPP and which
could be used to comply with the CPP. Nonetheless, Trump’s EPA proposes a
complete CPP repeal and does not commit to a replacement rule. See Repeal of Carbon
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
60). EPA’s new leader, Scott Pruitt, was focused on such policy reversals from the
time of his appointment. Kevin Bogardus, Pruitt Questions Agency’s Authority to
Regulate
Carbon,
E&E
NEWS
(Feb.
20,
2017),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060050312
[https://perma.cc/TD4G-RW6C]
(reporting statements of new EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt indicating greater
willingness to abandon carbon regulation than stated in confirmation hearings).
Numerous other federal climate regulatory reversals are underway as of late 2017. See
Climate Deregulation Tracker, COLUM. L. SCH., SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L.,
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/climate-deregulation-tracker/
[https://perma.cc/A8BN-58K4] (identifying, among other items, proposals concerning
transportation planning, oil and gas mining emissions, motor vehicle emissions, and
climate science advisor policy shifts).
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ongoing and dynamic; whatever regulatory instruments and design are
chosen will shape and change the political and market terrain, and vice
versa.12 All policy reforms are “at risk,” facing post-enactment threats
and a dynamic environment.13 The challenges of climate change make
such regulatory derailment risks especially likely to be persistent
threats.
Federal harnessing of state roles, or at least preservation of the
possibility of state regulation alongside federal regulation,14 can be part
of an effective and durable regulatory design due to three effects linked
to federalism hedging: heightened stakeholder incentives to commit to
the federal regime; policy diffusion dynamics; and gradual
entrenchment of supportive coalitions through a process of path
dependence dynamics that result in “increasing returns” and “costs of
exit.”15 Relatedly, tested regulatory and market accomplishments create
12.
See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3–7, 159 (Donald R. Harris et al. eds.,
1992) (developing idea of “responsive regulation” shaped in light of linkages of markets
and regulation); WILLIAM W. BUZBEE, FIGHTING WESTWAY: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
CITIZEN ACTIVISM, AND THE REGULATORY WAR THAT TRANSFORMED NEW YORK CITY
31–51 (2014) (exploring how private actors and government officials engage in the “art
of regulatory war,” at all levels strategically interacting to pursue favored outcomes
both under law and to change law); Adrian Smith et al., Innovation Studies and
Sustainability Transitions: The Allure of the Multi-Level Perspective and its Challenges,
39 RES. POL’Y 435, 438 (2010) (noting that innovations are influenced by interacting
technical, business, policy, and government process factors).
13.
ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MAJOR
POLICY CHANGES ARE ENACTED 3 (2008). Patashnik’s insights are applied to climate
regulation in Biber, supra note 5, at 400–01, to explore why California’s climate law
survived a well-funded political attack. See also Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked
Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1158–59 (2009) (describing climate change “a ‘super wicked
problem’ that defies resolution” and citing Patashnik for reversal risks and need for
“precommitment” strategies).
14.
For ease of reading, I will generally refer to sub-national regulation
simply as “state” regulation, but states have sometimes addressed climate change
through regional agreements and local governments have taken their own additional
actions.
15.
For the most influential discussion of the path dependence and “increasing
returns” and “costs of exit” concepts, see Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path
Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 252 (2000). Others
building on these concepts regarding climate change are few, but nuanced analysis,
albeit in works with a different focus than this Article, are provided in Biber, supra
note 5, at 400–01 (in comparing state and federal legislation fates discussing Pierson
and how policy initiatives change interest group incentives); Brewster, supra note 5, at
251, 311 (discussing such concepts in considering the dynamics of national and
international climate regulation); and Pablo del Río & Xavier Labandeira, Barriers to
the Introduction of Market-Based Instruments in Climate Policies: An Integrated
Theoretical Framework, 10 ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y STUD. 41, 47–48 (2009) (mainly
looking at how path dependence dynamics create resistance to climate regulation).
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a body of experience and record that can provide a bulwark against
ungrounded claims of regulatory hardship, change coalitional political
dynamics, and provide a fact-based foundation for future regulation.16
For market actors supplying goods and services to meet a
regulatory goal, a web of regulation resulting from multiple regulators,
or at least potential regulators, is far more resilient and resistant to
wholesale derailment than would be complete dependence on a single
federal regulatory scheme. Retaining that state authority, even if just a
regulatory hedging strategy, fosters overall stability, creates room for
regulatory innovation, and thereby creates conditions conducive to
private investment to meet regulatory goals.
Legal durability is always important, especially where the
regulatory infrastructure is a critical underpinning of linked investments
and markets. This is especially true in the setting of climate
regulation.17 Always underlying climate politics and linked markets is
fear of all governments, citizens, and market actors that their
jurisdiction will act, but others will not. Such inaction or regulatory
reversals of others can disadvantage the climate-regulating jurisdiction,
lay waste to investors in related businesses and markets, and leave
GHG levels still on the rise.18
The climate and clean energy regulatory infrastructure is already
built on laws and regulations benefitted by federalism hedging.19
Concerted federal efforts to reverse course on climate change—a
constant in all climate regulation battles and an even more certain

16.
See Biber, supra note 5, at 401–02. See also discussion infra notes 194–
232 and accompanying text (reviewing how state, regional, and federal regulatory
initiatives collectively built clean energy momentum and enhanced its economic
competitiveness).
17.
Professor Lazarus emphasizes the importance of durability of climate
legislation. See Lazarus, supra note 13, at 1157, 1159. This Article starts with this
same basic assumption, but focuses on regulatory federalism and, especially, how such
federalism choices and webs of regulation will influence political and economic
dynamics, especially dependent markets and incentives for investments in clean energy
innovations.
18.
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 545–46 (2007) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (stating concern with futile United States regulation if China and India
pollution increased). See also To Prohibit the Regulation of Carbon Dioxide Emissions
in the United States Until China, India, and Russia Implement Similar Reductions, S.
15, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) (proposing to prohibit carbon dioxide regulation until
China, India, and Russia implemented climate change policies).
19.
See Contextual Environmental Federalism, supra note 3, at 112–13;
William W. Buzbee, Federalism-Facilitated Regulatory Innovation and Regression in a
Time of Environmental Legislative Gridlock, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 451, 464–77
(2016). See also infra notes 180–232 and accompanying text (analyzing such federalism
hedging in federal law and its influence on clean energy and pollution reduction trends
and political proposals).
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scenario under the Trump administration—will surely slow and might
even halt federally led climate progress. The existence of federalism
hedging strategies, however, will likely reduce the scale of such
reversals and also set the stage for future progress.
Part I defines and introduces the dynamics and theoretical effects
of federalism hedging. Part II then turns to the climate regulation case
study, starting by reviewing why climate change poses a thorny
regulatory challenge that is subject to ongoing contestation. Part III
then turns to climate federalism choices, starting with a review of
recurrent arguments in favor of preemptive federal climate regulation.
It then illuminates the generative benefits of federalism hedging, tracing
the development of clean energy businesses and associated regulatory
innovation. State policy innovations and litigation have prompted clean
energy progress at both the state and federal level, as has federal policy
support. Retained latitude for state regulation has shaped the form of
federal regulation plus reduced risks of regulatory reversal. Part IV
then melds the climate regulatory history with federalism hedging
theory to explore how retention of concurrent federal and state
authority reduces regulatory failure and policy reversal risks. Such
hedging predictably gives rise to coalitions favoring climate progress.
After a brief foray into the merits of a carbon tax versus cap-and-trade
based regulation assessed with a focus on regulatory derailment risks,
the Article closes with doctrinal analysis to highlight challenges to
effective statutory drafting that would harness the benefits of federalism
hedging.
I. FEDERALISM HEDGING AND THE BENEFITS OF REGULATORY WEBS
Federalism’s virtues have been well cataloged and much repeated,
from the founding era to a wave of recent scholarship analyzing the
Supreme Court’s recent federalism revival.20 This Part introduces the
concept of “federalism hedging,” situating it within recent years’
judicial and scholarly ferment about federalism. Even in a regulatory
setting where virtually all agree that regulation would ideally be devised
by the largest jurisdictional unit, be it national or international,
federalism hedging’s virtues remain important.21

20.
For a concise review of those development and key facets of modern
federalism doctrine and related legal materials, see ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 85–166 (7th ed. 2015) (reviewing
environmental federalism). See also supra note 3 (citing a cross section of this
literature).
21.
See Brewster, supra note 5, at 256–47.
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Although much federalism scholarship and jurisprudence focuses
on constitutional limitations, actual decisions finding federal laws or
actions to violate constitutional limitations remain rare. Still, legislation
based on the Commerce Clause no longer receives a judicial rubber
stamp,22 federal law now clearly cannot just “commandeer” state
actors,23 and regulation can be unconstitutionally coercive in eliciting
state cooperation through the use of conditional federal spending.24 In
the courts, federalism canons often drive arguments for more searching
and even hostile judicial review.25 Preemption decisions from recent
decades are numerous, tend to be law and fact specific, and are
sometimes hard to reconcile.26 This array of federalism cases
collectively creates little clear law, but in their aggregate impact teaches
that congressional federalism choices—whatever they are—need to be
clear to avoid uncertain future outcomes.27
But where federalism is at its most important, or at least most
often in play, is in congressional and agency choices about how
legislation and resulting bodies of regulation should allocate or preserve
federal, state, and sometimes local authority. Should a federal program
entice states to play a regulatory role, or should states work

22.
See Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional
Federalism: Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1199, 1250–52 (2003) (critiquing modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence
limiting federal power with focus on implications of manipulation of the “activities”
frame).
23.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (quoting Hodel v.
Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)) (concluding that
“Congress may not simply commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States”).
24.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604–05 (2012)
(holding that the Medicaid expansion provision of the Affordable Care Act and
threatened loss of conditional federal spending was “economic dragooning that leaves
the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion”).
25.
See infra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing use of federalism in
arguments against the Clean Power Plan); see also John F. Manning, Clear Statement
Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 437–38 (2010) [hereinafter Clear
Statement Rules and the Constitution] (criticizing use of federalism canons due to lack
of “principled metric” to constrain their use); John F. Manning, The Nondelegation
Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 224 [hereinafter The
Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance] (questioning use of the nondelegation
doctrine “to disturb the apparent lines of compromise produced by the legislative
process”).
26.
See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL
BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES (2008) (analyzing pro-preemption arguments and
policy shifts and their anti-regulatory aims); Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court
Preemption Doctrine, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 5 (reviewing preemption law
doctrinal shifts and tensions).
27.
See infra notes 326–40 and accompanying text (discussing need for clarity
regarding climate federalism choices).
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independently even if alongside federal initiatives, or should a federal
law be preemptive? In making such choices, the Constitution seldom
provides the answers, although the existence of these layers of
government is, of course, a result of constitutional design.28
Retaining or asserting a federal role (whether exclusive or
concurrent with state regulation) is often linked to economies of scale,29
underinvestment in information without a federal role,30 and expertise
that a dedicated federal agency develops as it investigates and shares
information with the whole nation.31 It also often sets a minimum
required level of safety (a floor) to avoid a regulatory race to the
bottom, where jurisdictions might otherwise compete by offering
regulatory laxity.32 Where a uniform federal rule is possible, it can
avoid heightened compliance costs associated with a varied
“patchwork” of regulation since many businesses operate or sell across
many states.33
Congress rarely completely preempts state regulatory authority.
More often, through cooperative federalism structures, limited
assertions of federal power, and savings clauses preserving state power
to do more, Congress creates regulatory regimes that retain concurrent,

28.
See supra note 3 (citing scholarship discussing federalism and allocation
of regulatory roles).
29.
Robert W. Hahn et al., Federalism and Regulation, REGULATION, Winter
2003–04, at 46, 47; see also Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting:
Is There a “Race” and Is it “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 287–88 (1997)
(identifying economies of scale in scientific research as a benefit of a federal regulatory
role); Dave Owen, Regional Federal Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58, 60 (2016)
(in analysis of de facto regional governance, identifying benefits of federal role).
30.
See Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and
Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1, 32–33 (1999) (explaining
cooperative federalism schemes’ attributes); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional
Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 132–33 (2005)
(critiquing “matching principle”).
31.
Hahn et al., supra note 29, at 47–48; see also Metzger, supra note 3, at
2083 (arguing that policy expertise is critical to balancing federal and state regulatory
roles).
32.
Hahn et al., supra note 29, at 47; see also Engel, supra note 29, at 294
(analyzing how federal environmental law sought to prevent “a race to low
environmental quality”). But see Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate
Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (challenging underpinnings of the “raceto-the-bottom” rationale for federal environmental standard setting).
33.
See Engel, supra note 29, at 288 (arguing that federal environmental
regulation “lower[s] the potential barriers to interstate trade”); see also Philip J.
Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the
Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1710 (2001) (arguing for benefits of uniform
national rules when “parties are not rooted in a particular state”).
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interacting and intertwined federal and state roles.34 This sort of
arrangement harnessing concurrent and interacting federal and state
authority is an essential element of federalism hedging. It is referred to
as providing “hedging” effects because, as explored through this
Article, it provides an array of second-best benefits that are likely the
optimal possible answer even where, as with climate change, the likely
ideal arrangement would utilize a single, well crafted, preemptive and
stable federal regulatory regime.
The prevalent use of overlapping and interacting roles, especially
where state and local governments provide the initial implementation
and enforcement role, is justified as enhancing accountability and
allowing for tailoring of regulation to local conditions and priorities.35
Latitude for state policy differences facilitates experimentation among
the states as “laboratories of democracy,” a virtue long ago recognized
by Justice Brandeis.36 While direct conflicts with federal law will
always be preempted under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause,
Congress usually leaves some room for state difference.
Most importantly, under prevailing use of “floor preemption,”
states can regulate a risk more aggressively than provided by federal
law.37 This can include not just more stringent regulation, but also
states filling in regulatory gaps.38 So, for example, federal law may
require products or conduct to minimize risks, but states usually can
ratchet performance standards down more, prohibit certain sources of
risk, or adopt complementary policies that foster related improvements
in performance or conditions.
The federal government also at times subsidizes and hence
incentivizes states to regulate.39 And under ubiquitous cooperative

34.
See Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 3 (exploring federalism choices,
the norm of federal regulatory floors, and the differences between federalism floors and
ceilings).
35.
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (identifying other virtues
of federalism associated with separation of roles and distinct preserved state turf).
36.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (stating “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country”).
37.
See Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 3 (analyzing implications of
regulatory floors and ceilings in preemptive regimes); Glicksman & Levy, supra note 5
(analyzing ceiling preemption in the setting of climate regulation).
38.
See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy
Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 18 (in analyzing concurrent federal and state
roles in energy law, identifying settings where states address gaps in federal coverage).
39.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (reviewing
regulatory tools federal government can permissibly use to elicit state involvement,
including conditional federal spending).
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federalism structures, also often called delegated programs, states can
take over implementation and enforcement of a federal program.40 As
long as they meet federal requirements, the states can choose how to
achieve such goals and also, due to savings clauses and floor
preemption provisions, do more without stirring up litigation. As
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote in Union Electric41 regarding the
Clean Air Act’s key cooperative federalism provision, as long as states
comply with federal law, they retain the option to regulate a business so
stringently that it might go out of business.42 In all of these settings, the
federal government may be the motivator, but the innovator and firstline regulator will often be the states.
Overlapping bodies of federal and state law—whether under
cooperative federalism structures or rooted in the separate authority of
federal and state governments—can also deter targets of regulation from
violating the law with hopes of impunity.43 Violations and damaging
conduct are more likely to be regulated, caught, and punished.
Relatedly, both federal and state law usually enlist citizen enforcement
to make the law real and reduce risks of unlawful behavior.44
Cooperative federalism structures require delegated states to protect
citizen participation and enforcement rights.45
Others identify states’ interaction with each other and with the
federal government as providing room for federalism-facilitated
horizontal (state-to-state) and vertical (state-federal) learning. As

40.
See Shana Campbell Jones, Making Regional and Local TMDLs Work:
The Chesapeake Bay TMDL and Lessons from the Lynnhaven River, 38 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 277, 289 (2014) (describing the cooperative federalism
framework of the Clean Water Act); see also Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy
Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399, 452–53 (2016) (arguing that federal energy statutes,
such as the Federal Power Act, provide authority for establishment of a regulatory
scheme with overlapping federal and state roles); Jessica M. Wilkins, Note, The
Validity of the Clean Power Plan’s Emissions Trading Provisions, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1386, 1392 (2016) (describing the cooperative federalism framework of the Clean Air
Act).
41.
427 U.S. 246 (1976).
42.
Id. at 265 (stating the statute provides “no basis for the [federal]
Administrator ever to reject a state implementation plan on the ground that it is
economically or technologically infeasible”).
43.
ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 124, 154 (2009) (discussing benefits of
overlapping federal and state roles as “provid[ing] a redundancy that bridges the
remedial gap”).
44.
See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012) (permitting citizen
suits under the Clean Air Act).
45.
See, e.g., Commonwealth of Va. v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1996)
(upholding federal rejection of delegated state air permit program due to failure to
provide adequate citizen access to judicial review of regulatory actions).
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Robert Schapiro explores, the “polyphony” of regulatory voices can
generate different and more informed answers than would a single
voice; one regulator’s involvement does not logically mean another
must be displaced.46 Uncertainty about shared or uncertain regulatory
turfs can, however, lead to “regulatory commons” dynamics and create
incentives for regulatory neglect.47 Other more recent works explore the
dynamics and value of uncooperative and often clashing federal and
state roles, seeing benefits in such “uncooperative” and “iterative”
interactions.48
Federalism-facilitated differences and experiments include not just
the benefits of better policy and latitude for interactive and “dialectical”
exchanges that can facilitate innovation, but failed policy experiments
as well.49 The price of error is far smaller when its costs fall on those
affected in one state than if the error were national in scope. And each
error provides lessons for improved future regulation.50
Perhaps because much of this federalism discourse focuses on
constitutional lines or risk regulation, it sometimes pays little attention
to federalism choices where regulation may provide a crucial
underpinning of a market, let alone where the effectiveness of
regulation is contingent on market-generated innovations.51 Yet, as
exists in the climate regulation and clean and renewable energy areas
46.
SCHAPIRO, supra note 43, at 154 (analyzing federalism-facilitated
overlapping and interacting regulatory roles as akin to “polyphony” in music).
47.
William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 5 (2003) (identifying as regulatory commons
challenges settings where multiple jurisdictions have potential regulation over an issue
and analyzing resulting incentives for potential regulators to leave social ills
unaddressed).
48.
See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative
Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009); see also Iterative Federalism and Climate
Change, supra note 5, at 1099 (observing that body of climate regulation is “the
result[] of repeated, sustained, and dynamic lawmaking efforts involving both levels of
government—what I term ‘iterative federalism’”).
49.
Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 879–98
(2006) (identifying benefits of dialectical regulation).
50.
Light, supra note 2, at 360–65 (discussing benefits of precautionary
federalism, including jurisdictional learning and avoiding regulatory over commitment
in settings of change and innovation).
51.
In an “innovation studies” analysis, Smith and co-authors note this
interactive influence of regulation and business innovation. See Smith et al., supra note
12, at 439. See also Diane Cardwell & Julie Cresswell, SolarCity and Other Rooftop
Providers Face a Cloudier Future, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2016),
https://nyti.ms/1XjNSWS
[https://web.archive.org/web/20171208151043/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/b
usiness/energy-environment/rooftop-solar-providers-face-a-cloudier-future.html]
(discussing confluence of regulatory policy shifts, energy fuel cost shifts, and evolving
solar business models and resulting effects on solar companies).
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analyzed below, regulation can serve in two reciprocal and bivalent
roles that are facilitated through federalism hedging allocations:
regulation may mitigate a risk, yet at the same time create demand for a
market product or service that helps address that risk.52 Furthermore,
regulatory success and stability will often depend on market and
business innovations that over time will make regulatory burdens
palatable.53 In one sense, this is no surprise: all regulation influences
market activity.54 In fact, a long-stated Chicago School view of
regulation is that most regulation, even ostensibly constraining
regulation, actually serves the interests of the targets of regulation.55
This influential view, however, fails to consider how regulation often
implicates both targets of regulation (the Stigler focus, focusing on
barriers to entry) as well as other businesses that will seize
opportunities to develop cost-effective means to meet regulatory
obligations.56
Such businesses developing services and products to assist with
regulatory compliance and improved performance can be substantially
dependent on that regulation.57 For example, businesses that sell
52.
See Camille von Kaenel, When Trump’s Deregulation is at Odds with
Industry, E&E NEWS (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060059190
[https://perma.cc/U7FN-CPZH] (discussing businesses prepared to sell products to
meet fuel economy regulatory requirements and hence concerned with regulatory
instability or opposed to deregulation); infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text
(explaining CPP design and role of business practices and state regulations in CPP
design and stringency).
53.
See Richard Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public
Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 574 (2001) (noting that the “impetus for
regulation sometimes comes from manufacturers of pollution control equipment,
environmentally friendly technologies, or inputs to production processes favored by the
regulatory regime”).
54.
Daniel L. Millimet et al., Environmental Regulations and Economic
Activity: Influence on Market Structure, 2009 ANN. REV. RESOURCE ECON. 99
(reviewing scholarly literature on the effect of environmental regulation on market
structure).
55.
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971) (positing that “regulation is acquired by the industry and is
designed and operated primarily for its benefit”).
56.
For example, anti-regulatory steps early in the Trump Administration, in
particular an across-the-board regulatory “freeze,” were criticized by numerous
businesses and sectors that had supported such regulations and often designed their
businesses in light of them. See, e.g., Lorraine Woellert, Trump’s Regulation Freeze
Makes Losers Out of Some U.S. Businesses, POLITICO (Jan. 27, 2017, 5:10 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/trump-regulation-freeze-businesses-234250
[https://perma.cc/4WKH-L67J]; von Kaenel, supra note 52 (same, with business
concern about loss of regulatory impetus for fuel economy standards).
57.
See Nicholas A. Ashford & Ralph P. Hall, The Importance of RegulationInduced Innovation for Sustainable Development, 3 SUSTAINABILITY\ 270, 279 (2011)
(exploring how “[s]tringent regulation can stimulate new entrants” into markets and
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particular pollution control equipment may only have a market as a
result of regulation.58 When the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments
created the acid rain cap-and-trade program, it created a new market
for businesses that measured pollution and handled and monitored
trades of sulfur dioxide allowances.59 Similarly, as explored in depth
below, recent growth in clean and renewable energy businesses has
been shaped by a complex confluence of state and federal energy
policy, the existence of government subsidies and tax incentives, clean
and renewable energy mandates, and regulatory efforts to reduce GHG
emissions.60 And some business models—for example, the development
of creditable carbon offsets—can be almost completely dependent on
regulatory recognition.61 Where a market, regulation, and regulatory
progress are interdependent—as they long have been in utility and
energy regulation and are today with climate regulation as well—then
confidence in the ongoing existence of that regulation is crucial. Policy
stability is essential for businesses to plan and flourish.
These shifts in stakeholder interests and the regulation-market link
are critical effects of federalism hedging. Increased entrenchment of
regulatory and market commitments over time creates incentives for
business interests to become political coalitions that oppose regulatory

“displace dominant technologies”); William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon
Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1620 (2014) (arguing public utility regulation should
be seen “less as an obstacle to markets and innovation and more as an ‘instrument of
the commonwealth’” that could “play an important role in the effort to secure a lowcarbon future.”); Millimet et al., supra note 54 (discussing how increased
environmental regulation can both benefit and burden businesses); David B. Spence,
Naïve Energy Markets, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 973 (2017) (discussing implications of
links of energy markets and regulatory design).
58.
Revesz, supra note 53, at 574 (recounting how businesses emerged in
response to the federal Superfund statute).
59.
For discussions of resulting market activity, see John J. Fialka, Breathing
Easy: Clear Skies are Goal as Pollution is Turned into a Commodity, WALL ST. J., Oct.
3, 1997 at A1 (analyzing markets reacting to 1990 Clean Air Act adoption of cap-andtrade regime); Bruce W. McClain & Heidi Hylton Meier, The US Cap and Trade
Initiative: Current Status and Potential Impact on Business, 28 AM. J. BUS. 7, 10, 14–
15 (2013) (analyzing past business responses to cap-and-trade regulation in assessing
prospects of new proposals).
60.
See, e.g., William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism:
Ratemaking and Policy Innovations in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 884–
85 (2016) (arguing that variety of market forms, state and regional regulatory
frameworks, and diverse state energy profiles and clean energy strategies have served
as a sort of natural experiment).
61.
William Boyd & James Salzman, The Curious Case of Greening in
Carbon Markets, 41 ENVTL. L. 73, 77–78 (2011) (arguing that regulation has spurred
the growth of carbon offset markets).
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change that could unsettle their markets.62 Federalism-facilitated
preservation of concurrent and overlapping federal and state roles can
be central to such shifts in interests; such shifts in stakeholder interests
are one of the ways in which federalism can serve in a hedging role,
reducing risks of regulatory instability and reversal.63
Regulatory structures that underpin markets, however, can come
with a downside when returns are actually guaranteed, a downside that
shapes opposition to clean energy. For example, “cost-of-service”
based energy utility regulation guarantees utilities a return on large
infrastructure investments due to the need for such stability.64 Utilities
predictably oppose a shift away from this arrangement.65 Regulatory or
business shifts that reduce dependence on such utility-provided energy
infrastructure pose an existential threat to such utilities, as concluded in
a recent industry whitepaper.66 Relatedly, the low level of United States
energy utility investment in research and development is attributed to
the guaranteed returns enjoyed by incumbent monopolies facing little or
no competition.67
Such guarantees of business viability or government choice of
regulatory tools are rare. In most fields of regulation, regulatory
structures utilize a complex mix of mandates and incentives such as
performance standards, information elicitation, regulatory nudges via
subsidies, tax policies and charges, and planning mandates.68 In

62.
See Dani Rodrik, Green Industrial Policy, 30 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y
469, 470–72 (2014) (discussing how green industry policy can engender commitment
and encourage progress) (discussed in Jonas Meckling et al., Winning Coalitions for
Climate Policy, 349 SCI. 1170, 1170 (2015)).
63.
See Meckling et al., supra note 62, at 1070–71 (observing how “green
industrial policy” builds “interests and coalitions” and suggesting such coalition
building should be a policy design goal). For further discussion of federalism and
entrenching of regulation and business support, see infra notes 284-317 and
accompanying text.
64.
See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 60, at 827–28 (describing how the
traditional “cost-of-service” model of ratemaking operates).
65.
Spence, supra note 57, at 1010 & n.211 (citing Harvey Averch & Leland
L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraints, 52 AM. ECON. REV.
1052, 1052 (1962) and Léon Courville, Regulation and Efficiency in the Electric Utility
Industry, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 53 (1974) in discussion of incentives for
“unnecessary capital investments” created by “cost of service” regulation).
66.
PETER KIND, DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND
STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS (2013).
67.
See Felix Mormann, Requirements for a Renewables Revolution, 38
ECOLOGY L.Q. 903, 917–18 (2011) (discussing incentives created by such regulation
and resulting minimal innovation investments).
68.
For discussion of the rich array of regulatory tools, see GLICKSMAN ET
AL., supra note 20, at 81–84, 1080–84, 1089–90 (reviewing array of regulatory
strategies utilized in environmental laws); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance,
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aggregate, these sort of mixed regulatory approaches create a web of
rewards and expectations that underpin market choices and also shape
responses of federal, state and local actors, but without specifying
exactly what must be done.
The existence of federalism hedging and regulatory webs links to
the forms of regulation utilized in such an interdependent matrix of
regulation, market, and technological progress. Where regulation is
fashioned in the typical form of a performance standard requiring
achievement of a level of pollution, risk, or percentage of low carbon
energy, rather than a rare technological and behavioral mandate, it is
the results that matter; how a regulator or target of regulation meets
that challenge is not dictated. Businesses have some profit-seeking
incentive to find the most cost-effective means to meet those
requirements.69 But the rigor, reality, or permanence of regulation can
vary. And as legal edicts underlying a market and business activity
weaken or are embattled, markets will react, sometimes with abrupt
downturns.70

1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 634–35 (discussing regulatory design choices and benefits of
market-based regulation).
69.
Businesses may, however, simply adopt the most readily available riskreduction strategies. William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory
Interaction, and the Quest for Stewardship and Intergenerational Equity, 77 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1521, 1537 (2009). Market-utilizing modes of regulation are
championed as providing ongoing incentives for performance improvements. See
Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate
Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008) (reviewing benefits of market-utilizing
modes of regulation and suggesting such a regime for climate change regulation); Bryon
Swift, U.S. Emissions Trading: Myths, Realities, and Opportunities, 20 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T, no. 1, 2005, at 3, 7 (2005). But see DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE
ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2003) (questioning extent to which
market-based regulation will spur improved performance).
70.
One extreme example is illustrated by President Trump’s election. On the
day following Trump’s win, shares dropped across the renewable energy sector. See
Michael Copley, Renewables Wake Up to the Challenge of President Trump, SNL
ENERGY POWER DAILY, Nov. 10, 2016; Manikandan Raman, Solar Stocks Red as
Trump Win Turns Sector Bearish, SunPower Downgraded, BENZINGA NEWSWIRES,
Nov. 9, 2016; Trump Win Raises Fears Over Climate Change Goals, Hits Renewable
Stock, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2016, 10:35 AM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/usa-electionclimatechange-update-1-pix/update-1-trump-win-raises-fears-over-climate-change-goalshits-renewable-stocks-idUKL8N1DA742 [https://perma.cc/Y7LV-CBPD]; see also
Mormann, supra note 67, at 933–35 (suggesting that a weak regulatory scheme has
prevented the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative from being an effective cap-and-trade
market). Nonetheless, such market drops do not mean market collapse; clean energy
products and businesses have become increasingly competitive and remain an attractive
investment. See infra notes 194–232 and accompanying text; see also Stanley Reed, An
Opportunity Rises Offshore, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2017, at B1 (analyzing promise of
wind power businesses); Paul Sullivan, Washington May Shift from Clean Energy, but
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Most existing federalism discourse, however, devotes little
attention to this regulation-market link and, especially, how federalism
allocations of concurrent and overlapping authority can create
regulatory hedging effects, undergirding private markets that are often
crucial to achieving effective responses to a regulatory challenge.71
Retained state authority to regulate in a field, even if just latent, can
serve as a federalism hedge by changing the incentives of both private
actors and public officials.
With retained, shared federal and state jurisdiction over a source
of risk, federal regulatory instability or reversal will not result in the
collapse of interdependent markets and businesses.72 Concurrent federal
and state regulation works this way because, in the aggregate, federal
and state regulation will form a web of regulatory signals that can
create or undergird market demand. No single jurisdiction’s regulatory
reversals or instability will destroy the market or product category
demand.
Furthermore, where policy signals are broad—as they are in
rewarding or incentivizing renewable energy, clean energy, and
pollution reduction without dictating means to such ends—then
investments are unlikely to be inordinately concentrated on any single
type of product or method. Policy reversals or failures at one level of
government or in a few states are unlikely to unsettle all dependent
markets.
As a result, both regulators and those supplying goods and services
in any regulated market will become invested in that market and the
linked regulatory infrastructure, increasingly incentivizing such
individuals, organizations, and regulators to commit to the body of
regulation.73 Bodies of regulation undergirding such markets will
become entrenched and less vulnerable to abrupt abandonment.
In contrast, if an entire market is driven by a single federal
regulatory policy set by a preemptive regime, the risks of policy
instability or abandonment are far greater. Indeed, as shown below
from environmental law’s history and linked federalism dynamics, the
Investors Shouldn’t, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2017, at B3 (discussing why clean energy
investments remain attractive).
71.
Cf. Alice Kaswan, Decentralizing Cap-and-Trade? State Controls within a
Federal Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Program, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 343, 346–47
(2010) (arguing that state autonomy in federal cap-and-trade regulatory schemes
provides “a safety net for federal failure”).
72.
See id. at 355–56 (citing David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive
Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92
MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1813–14 (2008)).
73.
See infra 242–46 and accompanying text (analyzing state and industry
support for the CPP).
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mere possibility of more varied and possibly more onerous state
regulation can reduce the risk of such federal policy reversal or even
catalyze calls for federal regulation.74 The rewards for fighting
regulation will diminish if success leaves another layer of regulation,
especially if that layer is made up of disparate state policies.
None of this discussion is meant to downplay the importance of
strong, stable federal policies to articulate essential policy goals and
send effective and enduring market signals where investment and
innovation are needed. Nor is it advocating state regulation in lieu of
federal or international regulation. Regulation at the largest scale
possible will often make the best sense, especially if the law utilizes
market-based regulatory tools. With a larger market, more beneficial
trades will be possible. If technological innovation is needed, national
regulatory incentives will hold more promise than efforts by a few
states.
Instead, the point is that federalism choices need to consider not
just idealized and unrealistically permanent regulation, but risks of
policy instability and how such instability might not only eliminate a
policy mandate, but also unsettle markets and product developments
that might help to address a social ill. Retention of concurrent state
authority can serve as a federalism hedge, changing the incentives of
private and public actors and building supportive coalitions. Regulatory
structures utilizing such a federalism hedge—the retention of potential
regulatory roles for both federal and state regulators—will create
incentives for and help preserve a regulatory web able to stand the
vagaries of politics and regulation that accompany any area
characterized by contestation, rapid change, and innovation.
The challenge of climate change and progress in combatting it and
producing energy through cleaner means reveals the centrality of
federalism hedging dynamics. The Article turns now to the climate
challenge case study.

74.
For discussion of ways state regulatory actions have triggered federal
regulation, see RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 208–10 (1999) (tracing
this history); Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra note 5
(same, in the climate area); J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of
Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1500–16
(2007) (same); E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The
Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326–29 (1985)
(exploring state regulation catalyzing federal regulation with focus mainly on the Clean
Air Act).
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II. THE CLIMATE REGULATION CHALLENGE AND BUSINESS NEED FOR
REGULATION
The importance of federalism choices in climate regulation links
directly to the difficulty in crafting any effective regulatory response to
climate change. This section provides a brief review of why climate
regulation is difficult to enact, sure to trigger ongoing opposition, yet
remains important to foster business investment necessary for largescale reductions in GHG emissions and related energy use.
This Article assumes that the basic nature of climate change
science and its anthropogenic causes are established.75 The most
prevalent GHG, carbon dioxide, is not a readily apparent pollutant. It is
invisible and a ubiquitous and essential part of the atmosphere.76 By
itself, it causes no immediate harms, although it is often emitted with
more risk-creating forms of pollution, especially since almost all
combustion of carbon-based fuels results in the release of GHGs.77
Many of its most severe impacts are generally at least decades into the
future and difficult to predict with any precision; climate change’s
particularized manifestations remain the source of probabilistic
predictions.78 And although an array of horribles are anticipated and
sometimes already observed due to climate change—rising
temperatures, more severe storms, glacial melt, and sea level rise being
the most prevalent predictions and observations—all are the result of

75.
For a succinct review of climate science and implications for climate
federalism choices, see Designing Effective Climate Policy, supra note 5. For a more
in-depth discussion of climate science, see GLICKSMAN, supra note 20, at 1172–90.
76.
See Elke Weber & Paul Stern, Public Understanding of Climate Change in
the United States, 66 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 315, 317–18 (2011) (analyzing public
misunderstanding of climate change).
77.
See R. T. Watson et al., Greenhouse Gases and Aerosols, in CLIMATE
CHANGE: THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT 1, 8–10 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 1990)
(detailing the cycle of carbon in nature); Overview of Greenhouse Gases, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/co2.html
[https://perma.cc/MU8Y-T53X].
78.
See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, The China Problem, 81 S. CAL. L.
REV. 905, 915 (2008) (listing different projections for growth in China’s emissions).
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numerous contributing causes.79 Climate skeptics can and do capitalize
on the inability to trace particular harms to climate change.80
Nevertheless, governments may see other reasons to regulate GHG
emissions or energy efficiency, especially responsiveness to citizen
calls for regulation, desires for greater energy independence, or other
benefits of reducing pollution that causes an array of harms in addition
to climate change.81 Still, an invisible pollutant causing uncertain
dispersed harms, many expected to mostly occur in the future, add up
to a recipe for indifference and inaction, whether viewed through the
literature on citizen activism, political mobilization, political economic
frameworks, or behavioral economics.82
Viewed as a collective action and political-economic challenge,
effective climate change regulation faces formidable odds. Powerful
and concentrated interests see climate regulation and linked clean
energy shifts as a threat to their very existence. Regulation that creates
incentives for energy efficiency reduces demand and thus prompts a
shift away from carbon-based energy; that shift typically diverts
79.
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, Causes and Consequences of Climate
Change, in AMERICA’S CLIMATE CHOICES 18–23 (2011) (acknowledging inability to be
definitive about particular consequences of climate change); Richard Pancost & Stephan
Lewandowsky, Climate Uncertainty No Excuse for Inaction, SCI. AM. (Oct. 17, 2014),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/climate-uncertainty-no-excuse-for-inaction
[https://perma.cc/Q7KB-B6S7] (asserting that arguments against climate change action
are rooted in a misunderstanding of the science of uncertainty).
80.
Prominent federal politicians have seized on single events to claim
evidence of lack of climate change. See, e.g., Jim DeMint, (@JimDeMint), TWITTER
(Feb. 9, 2010, 9:46 AM), http://twitter.com/#!/JimDeMint/status/8863771523
[https://perma.cc/AT69-7UEN] (responding to a blizzard in Washington D.C. “It’s
going to keep snowing in DC until Al Gore cries ‘uncle’”); Elizabeth Shogren, Inhofe
Offers Parting Shot on Global Warming, NPR (Dec. 7, 2006, 6:00 AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6591614 (quoting U.S. Senator
James Inhofe referring to climate change as a “mass delusion”).
81.
Co-benefits of reductions in GHG emissions are many. See U.S. EPA,
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN POWER PLAN FINAL RULE (2015). For
discussion of other benefits of clean energy, see John C. Dernbach et al., Making the
States Full Partners in a National Climate Change Effort: A Necessary Element for
Sustainable Economic Development, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10597,
10602 (2010).
82.
See Brewster, supra note 5, at 268–69 (arguing efficacy of national
climate legislation for an international problem depends how it would “alter[] domestic
politics . . . and shape[] stakeholders’ interests in pursuing a comprehensive global
solution); Robert Gifford, The Dragons of Inaction: Psychological Barriers that Limit
Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation, 66 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 290, 290–97 (2011)
(identifying psychological barriers to impede climate responses); John D. Sterman &
Linda Booth Sweeney, Understanding Public Complacency About Climate Change:
Adults’ Mental Models of Climate Change Violate Conservation of Matter, 80 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 213 (2007) (analyzing implications of widespread misunderstanding about
climate change).
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revenues from fossil fuel industries and utilities and gives rise to new
competitors.83 Unsurprisingly, threatened industries have financed
climate regulatory opposition and criticisms of climate science.84
Electrical energy utilities previously secure in their business model now
face new competition, loss of guaranteed returns, and increasing
regulation of their pollution.85 In addition, at least at this time, one
political party—the Republican Party—has for years been heavily
invested in denying the existence of climate change, questioning its
causes, and opposing particular climate regulation initiatives as
ineffective or contrary to statutory authority.86 With the election of
President Trump, climate science skepticism and opposition to climate
regulation are again the view of majorities ruling the executive branch
and Congress.
The physical nature of climate change and linked political and
economic dynamics create a quintessential example of the challenge
identified by Mancur Olson: due to the costs of collective action,
businesses faced with direct and large regulatory costs or benefits will
tend to be advantaged over-dispersed small stakeholders, even where in
aggregate those small stakeholders’ interests outstrip the interests of the
business groups facing regulation.87 In the environmental and climate
arena, the businesses at risk wield tremendous power and face
regulatory costs now and an existential threat. In contrast, the risks of
climate change (which if addressed could be viewed as the benefits of

83.
See Biber, supra note 5, at 446–47 (noting that fossil fuel industries
oppose clean energy regulation because “dynamic shifts in the economic and political
landscape” could “pose a threat”); Robert J. Brulle, Institutionalizing Delay:
Foundation Funding and the Creation of U.S. Climate Change Counter-Movement
Organizations, 122 CLIMACTIC CHANGE 681 (2014) (tracing business funding of entities
opposing climate change regulation or challenging climate science); Riley E. Dunlap &
Aaron M. McCright, Organized Climate Change Denial 148, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY (John S. Dryzek et al. eds., 2011) (same).
84.
See supra note 83.
85.
See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE
US: A GUIDE 28 (2011); see also id. at 42–46 (describing the allowable regulated rate
of return for utilities in 2011).
86.
See JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE
BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT 198–225 (2016) (discussing the
increasing split between the Democratic and Republican parties over climate science
and regulation); Jonathan Chait, Why are Republicans the Only Climate ScienceDenying Party in the World?, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 27, 2015, 8:00 PM),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/09/whys-gop-only-science-denying-party-onearth.html [https://perma.cc/GKQ5-E2LE].
87.
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); see also Paul G. Harris, Collective Action on Climate
Change: The Logic of Regime Failure, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 195 (2007) (applying
Olson to analyze climate regulation).
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regulation) are dispersed and generally felt in the future by individuals
and other entities who would be likely to experience (or avoid) climatelinked disruptions.88 And risks to the environment itself are similarly
likely to be given short shrift in regulatory disputes.
Structurally, the cross-border nature of GHG pollution adds a
further complicating layer. A ton of carbon emitted or avoided has an
equal impact everywhere; GHG levels and climate change are a global
phenomenon.89 Any level of regulation smaller than the entire world
will necessarily be partial and can be undercut by the actions or
inaction of other jurisdictions.90 The pervasively shared atmosphere and
uncertain regulatory responsibilities are also subject to “regulatory
commons” dynamics; because no jurisdiction owns or is legally
responsible for climate change or on its own ability to regulate it
effectively, all jurisdictions face incentives not to act due to free rider
dynamics, fears of regulatory futility, or lack of political benefit.91
Nonetheless, climate progress has been made. A remarkable
proliferation of states, local governments, and regions now regulate
GHGs and have compelled growth in reliance on clean and renewable
energy. Despite claims that such sub-national action is illogical and
perhaps even futile, such state and local leadership undoubtedly show
that complete inaction is far from inevitable.92 The late Nobel Prize
winner, Elinor Ostrom, documented that effective ‘bottom-up’ climate
regulation was underway, theoretically understandable, and could be
effective.93 As further discussed below, states and their innovations
were critical to efforts to compel the federal government to act.

88.
See WILLIAM NORDHAUS, THE CLIMATE CASINO: RISK, UNCERTAINTY,
ECONOMICS FOR A WARMING WORLD 316–23 (2013) (analyzing how global
warming policies are in a special kind of gridlock); see also Harris, supra note 87
(“The costs of preventing climate change are immediate, but the benefits will not be
seen for many decades.”).
89.
Brewster, supra note 5, at 246–47.
90.
Id; Buzbee, supra note 47, at 6–7.
91.
See Buzbee, supra note 47, at 11–13, 22–36. Cf. Hari M. Osofsky,
Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the Obama Administration,
62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 280–87 (2011) (discussing “regulatory commons” concept and
offering a broader “diagonal” perspective to analyze transportation climate pollution).
92.
See Thomson & Arroyo, supra note 5; Kristen H. Engel & Scott R.
Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change,
32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 223–26 (2005). See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
93.
Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change,
(The World Bank Dev. Econ. Office of the Senior Vice President and Chief Econ.,
Working Paper No. 5095, 2009). For a more succinct development of similar points,
see Elinor Ostrom, A Multi-Scale Approach to Coping with Climate Change and Other
Collective Action Problems, SOLUTIONS, Mar.–Apr. 2010, at 27–35.

AND
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The same attributes of climate change that make regulation both
difficult and an uphill battle also create enduring incentives for
opposition to GHG regulation. All regulation is vulnerable to
derailment, but climate regulation is particularly likely to face ongoing
opposition, as it has now for several decades.94 As of 2017, climate
regulation opponents now lead the federal government.95
This uncertain regulatory terrain and faltering climate regulation
progress have long had a crucial impact on linked markets,
undercutting investments in the green economy and means to combat
climate change.96 For years, when climate legislation and regulation or
clean energy incentives ran into political or legal roadblocks, linked
markets responded directly and adversely.97 In one sense, this is no
surprise; law always provides a crucial undergirding for property rights
and markets.98
Nevertheless, despite the centrality of this regulation-market link,
little in climate federalism scholarship illuminates how market stability
and market demand for clean energy products and investments links to

94.
See supra notes 83–86, infra notes 190–93 and accompanying text (tracing
and analyzing climate related litigation and efforts to block or preclude climate
legislation or regulation). For journalism analyzing such opposition, see Robert Brulle,
America Has Been Duped on Climate Change, WASH. POST. (Jan. 6, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/01/06/america-has-beenlied-to-about-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/S5DZ-N4VJ]; Jamie Corey, Senator
Whitehouse Exposes ALEC Climate Change Denial, CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY’S
PRWATCH
(Mar.
13,
2015,
10:10
AM),
http://www.prwatch.org/news/2015/03/12771/senator-whitehouse-exposes-alec-climatechange-denial [https://perma.cc/683L-M2LQ]; Brulle, supra note 83.
95.
See supra note 11 (citing Trump statements and proposed climate
regulation reversals).
96.
Cf. Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Green and Competitive:
Ending the Stalemate, 73 HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1995, at 120, 120–21
(discussing neglected benefits of regulation and overestimation of regulatory costs).
97.
Inho Choi, Article, Global Climate Change and the Use of Economic
Approaches: The Ideal Design Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Trading with an Analysis of the European Union’s C02 Emissions Trading Directive and
the Climate Stewardship Act, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 865, 870–71 (2005) (finding
uncertain market environment chills capital investments in new and cleaner energy
technologies).
98.
See Averch & Johnson, supra note 65, at 1052, 1065–66, 1068; Michael
J. Brennan & Eduardo S. Schwartz, Consistent Regulatory Policy Under Uncertainty,
13 BELL J. ECON. 506, 506, 508–09 (1982); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089–93 (1972); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.
& ECON. 1, 15–16, 19, 23 (1960); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 460–61 (1897); Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework
for Economic Development, 13 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1, 1, 3, 7–8 (1998).
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the question of who should have authority to regulate climate ills.99 This
linkage is important because businesses and markets supporting efforts
to reduce GHG emissions and energy use have long been substantially
dependent on legally created incentives, scarcity and other legal
structures that reward, punish, or price those emissions or support
clean energy advances.100 Market value and business prospects have
been substantially contingent on the content and stability of such public
policies.101 But, as discussed below, regulation, markets, and
technology develop in tandem and can over time dramatically change
the competitiveness of business models and energy alternatives.102
Governmental policies influence the viability and competitiveness
of clean energy and pollution-reduction methods through signals both to
polluters and to businesses dedicated to reducing pollution or producing
cleaner energy. Fossil-fuel businesses do not compete in anything close
to a neutral or efficient market. They have long enjoyed massive
favorable subsidies.103 They also often benefit from low-cost leases.104

99.
For two exceptions that discuss the linkage, see Kaswan, supra note 5;
Mormann, supra note 67; see also Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA.
L. REV. 1621, 1646, 1668–69 (2015) (discussing clean energy federalism and business
viability and regulation link).
100. Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins, Using the Market to Address
Climate Change: Insights from Theory & Experience, 141 DAEDALUS 45, 48 (2012)
(discussing how a carbon tax incentivizes innovation); Kira R. Fabrizio, The Effect of
Regulatory Uncertainty on Investment: Evidence from Renewable Energy Generation,
29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 765, 766, 768–69 (2012) (discussing how state renewable
portfolio standards encourage investment and calling linked business assets “policy
specific” because “their value in their next-best use is substantially lower than their
value under the governing policy”); Adam B. Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, The Energy
Paradox and the Diffusion of Conservation Technology, 16 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON.
91, 97, 111–19 (1994) (stating that “any policy that increased the profitability of a
technology would speed its diffusion” and why there is need for “those externalities to
be internalized”).
101. Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private
Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 571 (2007) (stating firms have no
“intrinsic desire to reduce pollution levels in the absence of any government-set limits
on pollution”); Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 255, 290 (stating that “environmental resources are not, as a rule, under sufficient
pressure to warrant the adoption of market mechanisms”).
102. See infra notes 194–232 and accompanying text (tracing strengthening
price and technological competitiveness of clean energy businesses and linked
regulatory support).
103. For analysis of these subsidies supporting the fossil fuel industry, see
MGMT. INFO. SERV., INC., 60 YEARS OF ENERGY INCENTIVES: ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL
EXPENDITURES FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 7–17 (2011); SHAKUNTALA MAKHIJANI ET
AL., CASHING IN ON ALL OF THE ABOVE: U.S. FOSSIL FUEL SUBSIDIES UNDER OBAMA 4
(2014); see also ELIZABETH BAST ET AL., EMPTY PROMISES: G20 SUBSIDIES TO OIL, GAS
AND COAL PRODUCTION 12 (2015) (cataloguing such subsidies); ALEX DOUKAS, G20
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In addition, at this point, federal-level charges or other “Pigouvian”
taxes for GHG pollution harms are nonexistent. Hence, under federal
policy, fossil fuel extraction is encouraged through subsidies, while
climate harms from fossil fuel emissions remain an externalized cost
imposed on society without charge to the polluter. Post-2008 efforts to
set performance standards for GHG emissions have started to impose
regulatory costs, but do not directly tax or price such emissions.105
Every policy that supports fossil fuel-linked businesses works to the
disadvantage of new clean energy entrants. In addition, since the
‘fracking’ natural gas revolution, this abundant and cheaper form of
energy has undercut demand for even lower or zero carbon forms of
energy and linked technological innovation; fracking’s rise has led to
substantial utility and industry switching from coal to natural gas.106
Although solar and wind power are becoming competitive over the
long-term with carbon-based energy sources,107 utilities that supply
energy may see little or no benefit in such a switch unless they control
and can profit from such projects.108
SUBSIDIES TO OIL, GAS, AND COAL PRODUCTION: UNITED STATES 2–4 (2015) (describing
top five Federal and State subsidies for the fossil fuel industry).
104. See Kenneth Gillingham et al., Reforming the U.S. Coal Leasing
Program, 354 SCI. 1096, 1096–98 (2016) (comparing cost of climate damages and
production across three fossil fuel industries); Jayni Foley Hein, Oil Companies Are
Drilling on Public Land for the Price of a Cup of Coffee. Here’s Why That Should
Change,
WASH.
POST
(June
16,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/06/16/oil-companies-aredrilling-on-public-land-for-the-price-of-a-cup-of-coffee-heres-why-that-shouldchange/?utm_term=.92bc5794344b [https://perma.cc/Z8JN-G825] (reporting on low
cost drilling leases); ALAN KRUPNICK ET AL., PUTTING A CARBON CHARGE ON FEDERAL
COAL: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 7, 24 (2015) (providing overview of Federal coal
program). For analysis of offshore leasing arrangements, see CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
THE BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT’S FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM FOR OFFSHORE
OIL AND GAS LEASING: HISTORY AND PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR 2017-2022 at 9–13
(2016).
105. The embattled CPP was structured so both energy utilities and most states
would embrace market-based regulatory strategies, but did not mandate or create
markets directly. See supra note 5; see also infra notes 180–92, 222–30 (discussing
CPP proposal and battles).
106. See Shifali Gupta, Fracking Threatens U.S. Clean Energy Investment –
Experts, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. (Oct.
1, 2014, 9:53 GMT),
http://news.trust.org//item/20141001095359-n4eg5/ [https://perma.cc/9YV9-SUZY].
107. See INT’L. ENERGY AGENCY ET AL., PROJECTED COSTS OF GENERATING
ELECTRICITY 5 (2015) (finding that the costs of renewables have declined significantly
and are no longer cost outliers); Tara Patel, Fossil Fuels Losing Cost Advantage Over
Solar, Wind, IEA Says, BLOOMBERG (Aug 31, 2015, 7:15 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-31/solar-wind-power-costs-drop-asfossil-fuels-increase-iea-says [https://perma.cc/8QKJ-73H2].
108. See Rebecca Smith, Utilities’ Profit Recipe: Spend More, WALL ST. J.
(Apr 20, 2015, 6:04 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/utilities-profit-recipe-spend-
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Businesses and jurisdictions dependent on the fossil fuel sector for
such reasons led the opposition to the CPP, attributing a bleak future to
the CPP, while virtually ignoring the rise of fracking and dropping
costs of wind and solar.109 Despite clean energy innovations and
progress, greater pollution reductions are needed to reduce GHG
pollution to levels scientists say are needed to forestall the most serious
of climate disruptions. Individual behavioral shifts might help, but
regulatory mandates and inducements remain essential to strengthen
incentives for both individual and business change.110
Hence, the climate challenge for the law remains, at its essence,
figuring out effective means to respond to an innovation imperative in a
setting where opposition is steadfast and challenging regulatory
attributes remain. Climate-targeted regulation confronts a wealthy and
combative opposition, plus physical and political economic features that
make climate change a particularly thorny regulatory puzzle.
Regulation both disadvantages and in other facets undergirds clean
energy markets. Growing proof of carbon and clean energy market
viability and profitability remains essential to overcoming citizen,
market, and political opposition to more comprehensive regulation.
Federalism choices—especially the prevailing choice to retain latitude
for overlapping and interacting federal and state roles—have been and
will remain central to the viability and resilience of climate and clean
energy initiatives, as discussed the next Part.
III. THE CLIMATE FEDERALISM TERRAIN
Climate federalism choices are central to effective future climate
regulation, especially when assessed in light of incessant and fierce
opposition to climate and clean energy regulation. The federalism
overlap and interaction provided by current federal and state
more-1429567463 [https://perma.cc/S5JY-U5PK]. See Joby Warrick, Utilities Wage
Campaign
Against
Rooftop
Solar,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
7,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/utilities-sensing-threat-putsqueeze-on-booming-solar-roof-industry/2015/03/07/2d916f88-c1c9-11e4-ad5c3b8ce89f1b89_story.html?utm_term=.3ccd5bcb9019 [https://perma.cc/MCG4-D2BK];
DELOITTE GLOBAL SERVS., THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL POWER SECTOR 20 (2015),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Energy-andResources/gx-power-future-global-power-sector-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KYR5LXFG] (explaining distributed generation’s negative impact on the current utility
business model).
109. See infra at 180–246 and accompanying text (reviewing battles over the
Clean Power Plan).
110. Vandenbergh, supra note 78, at 929–30; Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne
C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1695–96,
1702–04 (2007).
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environmental and energy laws has been essential to regulatory
progress already underway. That state and local progress, plus the view
that more comprehensive action was needed, led to the unsuccessful
2009 and 2010 efforts by the Obama administration and congressional
allies to pass a comprehensive climate cap-and-trade law. But there too
federalism allocation choices and arguments for strongly preemptive
legislation provoked debate.
Even without enactment of climate-tailored federal legislation,
progress continued at the federal and state level under existing federal
law and under state initiatives. This sequence of actions and interactions
enabled by federal-state overlap and concurrent but separate
initiatives—as well as their linked impacts on businesses working in the
clean energy sector—is reviewed below to illuminate the dynamics of
federalism hedging. The protective elements of federalism hedging are
already becoming apparent in responses to the Trump Administration’s
overt efforts to unravel climate-focused regulations.
To launch this review of climate federalism’s terrain and the
generative and protective benefits of federalism hedging, the next
section starts by distilling key pro-preemption arguments. Then this
Part turns to the history of iterative and interactive federal and state
climate and clean energy regulation, unstopping contestation, and
progress. This history illuminates the dynamics and effects of
federalism hedging introduced in Part I. Drawing on that history, the
Article then returns in the final Part IV to federalism hedging analysis
and its implications for understanding and designing future climate
regulation.
A. The Climate Pro-Preemption Arguments
Despite the prevalence of non-preemptive environmental
regulation, pro-preemption arguments have repeatedly been made in
connection with climate regulation. During the first two years of the
Obama administration, prominent scholars, policymakers, and
regulatory stakeholders, generally speaking in support of federal
climate legislation, argued that it should preempt state and local climate
regulation.111 Those arguments were even more emphatically made by
111. For discussion or championing of such pro-preemption arguments, see,
e.g., Cary Coglianese & Jocelyn D’Ambrosio, Policymaking Under Pressure: The
Perils of Incremental Responses to Climate Change, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1413, 1425–27
(2008) (advocating for coordinated federal overhaul of climate policy, specifically a
national cap-and-trade program over “piecemeal” state experimentation); Robert N.
Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National Governments
Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293, 293–98, 323 [hereinafter
Policy Instruments for Climate Change] (arguing that “[o]n the domestic level, even the
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industry actors who, for a short period, appeared to condition support
for climate legislation on its utilization of a cap-and-trade strategy that
would preempt different or additional state approaches.112 Many others
opposed preemptive legislation. In the congressional arena, the leading
(but defeated) climate bills ultimately rejected a preemptive framework,
adopting language that would have retained substantial state climate
regulatory authority.113
More recently, a 2017 proposal by prominent self-labeled
“conservative” Republican financial and government leaders advocated
that the Republican-controlled federal government discard its emphatic
opposition to climate regulation and climate denialism.114 They
advocated a carbon tax, with proceeds to be returned to citizens under a
tax-and-dividend design.115 But that new proposal once again
championed elimination of other sources of regulation, calling for the
revocation of most regulations issued under the Clean Air Act and also
calling for the elimination of state law burdens.116

most cost-effective greenhouse policy instrument will be desirable only if the national
target it seeks to achieve is part of an accepted set of international mandates”); Robert
N. Stavins, State Eyes on the Climate Policy Prize, ENVTL. F., July–Aug. 2010, at 16,
16 [hereinafter State Eyes on the Climate Policy Prize] (arguing that “it makes no
sense” for Congress to preserve state climate roles and stating states should “get[] out
of the way”); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument
Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 686, 689 (1999) (comparing presumptions
about policy instrument choice when the legal context shifts from the national to
the global level); cf. Daniel C. Esty, Stepping Up to the Global Environmental
Challenge, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 103, 104–13 (1996) (exploring why anything less
than a global agreement will be inadequate, but not discussing state-federal issues).
112. See discussion infra notes 117–33, 160-79 (reviewing 2009–10 climate
legislative proposals, advocacy of preemptive regulation, and supportive rationales).
113. See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 1190–1211 (discussing
regulatory design choices, climate federalism, the 2009–10 leading bills and federalism
language).
114. The proposal was announced in a New York Times editorial. Martin S.
Feldstein et al., editorial, A Conservative Case for Climate Action, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
2017, at A25. More details were in several website papers. JAMES A. BAKER, III ET AL.,
THE
CONSERVATIVE
CASE
FOR
CARBON
DIVIDENDS
3
(2017),
https://www.clcouncil.org/media/TheConservativeCaseforCarbonDividends.pdf
[https://perma.cc/95WD-QKTG]; DAVID BAILEY & DAVID BOOKBINDER, A WINNING
TRADE
1
(2017),
https://www.clcouncil.org/media/A_Winning_Trade.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8ZZN-GG5L].
115. BAKER, III ET AL., supra note 114; BAILEY & BOOKBINDER, supra note
114.
116. BAKER, III ET AL., supra note 114; at 3 (calling for “significant regulatory
rollback” and specifying for elimination of most “EPA regulations” and “state tort
liability for emitters.”). Due to the skeletal form of this proposal, it is not clear if it
literally means tort liability, which would be unusual and rarely targeted at GHG
emission, or it meant to propose a broader preemption of overlapping state regulation.
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The pro-preemption arguments for federal climate regulation are
indeed strong, but only if one assumes a stable, perfect, and easily
implemented federal regulatory regime. As explained above in
introducing federalism hedging, as a matter of theory and as illustrated
by the history of environmental law and climate regulation, effectively
designed regulation must anticipate ongoing contestation and risks of
regulatory failure, political reversal, and other regulatory inadequacies.
The pragmatic argument for a preemptive federal climate law has
been linked to political necessity; a preemptive climate regulatory
regime might be the price to garner industry support necessary to enact
any future federal climate legislation or collectively comprehensive
regulation under existing law.117 The allure of such a unitary regulatory
framework was apparent when the automobile industry in 2010
supported a single federal standard following California’s concomitant
willingness to surrender its usual right to require an even lower
emitting car.118 Advocates supporting the recent 2017 tax-and-dividend
proposal likewise highlighted how it could eliminate other legal
burdens.119
The main public-regarding argument for a preemptive federal
climate regime focuses on regulatory effectiveness if climate regulation
utilizes a cap-and-trade regime or other market-based regulation.
Advocates of preemptive federal climate regulation argue that retaining
state climate authority would either hinder federal goals or merely be
futile acts that would raise production costs, injure the regulating
jurisdiction, but not actually lock in any climate-related benefits.120
Analysis of these claims follows.
If climate regulation were to rely primarily on a cap-and-trade
market, then it is correct that ideally there would be one stable market
at the largest scale possible, with one tradable currency, and ideally
venues in which trades and prices would be transparent.121 By using a
market-based regulatory strategy that allowed trading, policy

Surrounding texts repeated reference to “regulations” indicates a focus on elimination
of regulatory burdens. Id.
117. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 74, at 1500–16.
118. Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy:
Lessons from the “Car Deal”, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 344–64 (2011) (analyzing
circumstances and incentives leading to state and industry consent to the stringent new
auto emissions standard designed to reduce GHG emissions).
119. BAKER, III ET AL., supra note 114, at 1, 3.
120. Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local
Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1966–73 (2007).
121. See Esty, supra note 111, at 111–12.
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effectiveness would not depend on regulatory omniscience.122 And if the
market and linked regulation rewarded the most cost-effective
producers of energy or methods to reduce GHG emissions, then over
time market success and environmental benefits would go together.
In addition, the pro-preemption argument goes, any partial
regulation (whether state compared to national or national compared to
international regulation) could lead other jurisdictions to free ride on
the effective regulator’s efforts.123 Either one jurisdiction’s work would
benefit others, or others’ regulatory laxity could result in overall
pollution increases.124 Transaction costs and confusion would also
increase if conflicting and uncertain climate regulation and splintered
carbon markets resulted from sub-national regulation.125
Legislators considering the 2009 and 2010 cap-and-trade climate
bills explicitly explained their support for a federal climate law in such
terms. Sponsors alluded to concerns with a “patchwork” of state
requirements and “fifty different standards,” both standard lines
utilized by industry and the George W. Bush administration to justify
strong claims of preemptive effect by an array of agencies from around
2005 until late 2009.126 Senator Lindsey Graham stated, “I wouldn’t
support, you know, EPA regulation on top of congressional action, and
I couldn’t support 50 states coming up with their own standard.”127
122. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling
Information Deficits in Environmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1413–20
(2008).
123. See Rodrik, supra note 62, at 471–72, 483, 488 (not addressing
preemption issues, but explaining the jurisdictional free riding and distrust challenges);
Stavins, supra note 69, at 358 (noting the jurisdictional action dilemma in one of
several pieces exploring climate regulation design and advocating preemptive
regulation).
124. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 545 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing against standing for Massachusetts and other petitioners due to
alleged lack of redressability because other large polluting nations might not similarly
regulate and thereby emissions would still rise). The majority, however, measured
redress by judicial relief that would compel United States regulators to comply with the
law and reduce emissions. Id. at 515, 521.
125. See Stavins, supra note 69, at 298–99.
126. Stacy Morford, 5 AGs Urge Senate to Let States Set Higher Climate
Standards,
INSIDECLIMATE
NEWS
(Sept.
2,
2009),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/20090902/5-ags-urge-senate-let-states-set-higherclimate-standards [https://perma.cc/Q4NN-VR4S] (reporting on debates over making
federal climate legislation preemptive); David Roberts, Kerry, Graham, and Lieberman
Releases Framework for Senate Climate/Energy Bill, GRIST (Dec. 11, 2009),
http://grist.org/article/2009-12-10-kerry-graham-lieberman-release-framework-senateclimate-bill/ [https://perma.cc/PN7L-S9DQ].
127. Lisa Lerer, Climate Bill Would Curb EPA, POLITICO (Apr. 14, 2010, 5:16
AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0410/35750.html [https://perma.cc/9LL3B5W3].
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Thus, support for a federal law was linked to the view that a
multiplicity of related state laws would be too much, defeating federal
regulatory goals of cost-effective regulation.
Furthermore, pro-preemption advocates argued, if regulation from
any level of government dictated pollution performance standards, or
through subsidies and other monetary incentives chose winners and
losers, then government choices would undercut the main benefit of
market-based regulation, namely harnessing market actors’ search for
cost-effective means to achieve goals.128 Any regulation targeting
particular sources or sectors would reduce the benefits of unfettered
trading or the simplicity of incentives created by a market-based tool
like a carbon tax.129
A further argument voiced for preemptive federal legislation is
rooted in claims of futility. Because GHGs are ubiquitous and climate
change effects are rooted in worldwide GHG levels, critics of state
climate regulation argue that more stringent or additional state actions
could end up merely imposing costs locally and benefitting others.130 A
crackdown on GHG emitters by any governmental jurisdiction short of
an all-encompassing international regime could cause a ‘leakage’
problem, leading production to shift to less regulated environments,
creating little or no net climate benefit.131 Those higher polluting, more
lax jurisdictions might even develop a rigid anti-regulatory posture due
to the influx of new regulation-avoiding émigrés.132 Price effect leakage
could also occur, where law-induced forbearance would reduce demand
for carbon-based energy or carbon allowances, resulting in lowered
prices and then at least a modest rebounding surge in demand and
consumption.133 Under these perspectives, additional state and local

128. See Carlson, supra note 6, at 207, 210–12, 216, 221–22, 225–26, 228,
246–48; David Schoenbrod & Richard B. Stewart, The Cap-and-Trade Bait and Switch,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2009, at A13. Carlson, supra note 6, at 207, 210–12, 216, 221–
22, 225–26, 228, 246–48.
129. BAKER, III ET AL., supra note 114, at 1, 3.
130. State Eyes on the Climate Policy Prize, supra note 111.
131. Stavins, supra note 69, at 370.
132. See Brewster, supra note 5, at 287.
133. See Daniel A. Farber, Carbon Leakage Versus Policy Diffusion: The
Perils and Promise of Subglobal Climate Action, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 359, 368–72
(2013) (describing the price effect leakage and studies questioning if rebound would be
substantial); Lorna A. Greening et al., Energy Efficiency and Consumption — the
Rebound Effect — a Survey, 28 ENERGY POL’Y 389, 390–93, 395, 397–99 (2000)
(same); see also Jonathan S. Mazur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the
Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1557, 1588–91 (2011) (explaining
leakage dynamics and difficulty in predicting ultimate amount of leakage); CARBON
PRICING LEADERSHIP COAL., WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF CARBON PRICING ON
COMPETITIVENESS?
1–2
(2016),
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climate actions would burden polluters needlessly, both causing the
regulating jurisdictions harm and providing little or no net climate
change benefit.
These arguments both individually and collectively are powerful
and have an intuitive appeal. Many of these arguments can be distilled
to two linked fairly simple propositions: The larger the problem—and
here it is a global phenomenon in cause and effect—the larger the
needed regulator. And with market-based tools, create the largest
market possible and let market incentives work their magic.
But the actual history of climate and clean energy regulation and
related battles, plus the general federalism hedging theory introduced
earlier, provide a powerful refutation of calls for a federal-only climate
regulation answer. Before returning to application of federalism
hedging theory to the climate problem and insights to be drawn from
climate regulation’s history, the Article now sets the stage by tracing
the sequence of actions, reactions, and battles over climate and clean
energy regulation in recent decades. This history reveals the generative
benefits of overlap and interactions, as well as how such regulatory
structures tend to facilitate sequential pragmatic adjustment and
learning, can lead to business and regulatory innovation, plus reduce
risks of regulatory error or policy derailment. Of perhaps greater
importance, the analysis that follows illustrates how overlapping and
intertwined regulatory authority changes stakeholder interests and
incentives and leads to entrenchment and coalitional shifts that lessen
the risk of wholesale regulatory reversal or linked market collapse.
B. Seesawing Climate Legislative and Regulatory Battles and
Progress, 2008–14
Prior to 2008, the federal government did little to reduce emissions
of GHGs contributing to climate change. Agencies and scientists
studied the issue, but by the time science had become close to
unanimous that climate change was happening and substantially
influenced by human activity (so-called “anthropogenic” climate
change), it was during the 2001 to 2008 administration of George W.
Bush.134 His administration resisted any climate action. Occasional
tensions between agency officials and the White House emerged, such
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/759561467228928508/CPLC-Competitivenessprint2.pdf [https://perma.cc/QF7U-4ZK7] (explaining leakage concerns but analyzing
why amounts of leakage often are modest).
134. This history is both reviewed in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007), and led to the petition and subsequent court challenge the ultimately resulted in
Massachusetts to jump-start federal climate regulation. See infra at notes 145–58 and
accompanying text (reviewing this history).
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as when the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) drafted
testimony conceding climate change health impacts but then at the last
moment the review of public health risks was deleted from the
document.135 But inaction reigned.
The same was not true at the state and local level. Granted latitude
to enact more stringent or complementary pollution control and energy
policies by federal law, states acted. As discussed in the following
paragraphs, states provided or catalyzed climate progress through their
own regulatory actions on the environmental and clean energy front, by
challenging federal inaction in court, and later by supporting federal
regulation and documenting why it was well grounded in state-tested
regulatory and business practices.
Despite scholarly predictions of state inaction and laxity due to
political economic incentives not to impose hardship internally or
burden state industry with possibly ineffective regulation, state and
local governments and then later regions embraced an array of climate
change and clean and renewable energy strategies.136 They embraced
cap-and-trade programs, “renewable portfolio standards,” and other
strategies to reduce demand or pollution associated with the generation
of electricity.137 States have also used tax credits, deductions, and
subsidies to reduce GHG emissions and achieve other co-benefits such
as reduced health risks, a more stable energy supply, and a market
presence in the “green” economy.138 Furthermore, such state initiatives
also provided regulators and affected industry with experience with
somewhat varied regulatory and business models.139 Energy utilities (as
well as other sorts of polluters) also helped design, or at least learned to
cope with, cost-effective means of meeting and profiting under such
state clean energy and pollution control strictures.140
And even where states declined to so act, many electricityproducing utilities embraced measures to reduce demand, shift energy
135. Rick Piltz, Censored Testimony from Centers for Disease Control:
Update,
CLIMATE
SCI.
&
POL’Y
WATCH
(Oct.
28,
2007),
http://www.climatesciencewatch.org/2007/10/28/censored-testimony-from-centers-fordisease-control-update/ [https://perma.cc/5ZP5-LB5Z] (discussing White House edits
removing discussion of anticipated public health risks of climate change).
136. See Engel, supra note 5, at 1016–20; Thomson & Arroyo, supra note 5,
at 6, 9–10, 13–30.
137. See Mormann, supra note 67, at 906, 940, 951; Rossi, supra note 40, at
402, 405–06, 413–14, 424–25.
138. Rodrik, supra note 62, at 469, 473, 479, 486, 488 (discussing reasons
governments pursue “green” industrial policies and suggesting ways to conceive of,
measure, and further probabilities of success).
139. See infra notes 242–46 and accompanying text (discussing and citing to
CPP briefs of states and industries supportive of the plan).
140. See infra notes 242–46 and accompanying text.

BUZBEE – FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017:1037

1/19/2018 2:49 PM

Federalism Hedging

1073

fuels, or produce cleaner energy, often due to their cost-effectiveness,
reliability goals, and environmental compliance obligations. For
example, even long-time opponents of solar energy like the Southern
Company have come around, supporting state statutory and regulatory
changes allowing substantial increases in distributed energy, primarily
in the form of solar.141 Many companies also shifted from coal to gas,
often providing both environmental and economic benefits.
Experience with energy-related trading and linked regulation has
also increased. Wholesale markets for demand reduction commitments
have emerged and been embraced, with the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) supporting such markets and the Supreme Court
confirming such FERC authority.142 This federal regulatory intervention
built on a growing market for such bundling of demand reduction
commitments that, in turn, was incentivized by state clean energy
initiatives and utility responses to such changes.143 Numerous states and
regional entities managing multi-state energy markets known as
Independent System Operators or Regional Transmission Operators
supported FERC’s effort to further facilitate and grow wholesale
demand response markets that built on their experience.144
The second major state role in reducing GHG emission was as
litigants. Faced with the federal refusal of the Bush administration EPA
to regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act, Massachusetts and other
states petitioned for federal regulation of motor vehicle GHG emissions
and then challenged the denial of that petition.145 They focused upon
existing authority under the Clean Air Act to force EPA to engage with
the science and, due to strong evidence of “endangerment[s]” flowing
from climate change, regulate under the Clean Air Act.146

141. See Cassandra Sweet, Business News: Large U.S. Utilities Take Greener
Route --- Power Firms Increase Investments in Solar, Wind Amid Incentives, Looming
Federal Curbs, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2016, at B6 (reporting and analyzing power
company choices to invest more in solar and wind farms).
142. FERC v. Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 771, 777, 789 (2016)
(upholding FERC Order 745’s assertion of federal jurisdiction to support wholesale
demand response markets).
143. State actions leading to FERC’s actions included state inconsistency in
facilitating or embracing demand side efficiency innovations. Sharon B. Jacobs,
Bypassing Federalism and the Administrative Law of Negawatts, 100 IOWA L. REV.
885, 905 (2015); Rossi, supra note 40, at 452. This is another example of how federal
progress can be catalyzed by state regulatory activity. See supra note 74.
144. See Rossi, supra note 40, at 452.
145. Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change in the Supreme Court, 38 ENVTL. L. 1
(2008) (article by professor and co-counsel for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
discussing the history and strategies leading to the Massachusetts decision).
146. Id. at 10.
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That ability to differ with federal leadership and even sue is a
possibility distinctively associated with federalism; mere decentralized
structures would have provided no similar option.147 Furthermore,
because Congress empowered a stable and sophisticated regulatory
participant and litigant—namely the states—federal illegality and
regulatory inertia faced a potential countervailing check in the form of
the states.148
In Massachusetts v. EPA,149 Massachusetts was found to satisfy
standing and statutory hurdles in a Supreme Court opinion that rejected
federal declination to regulate GHG emissions.150 Massachusetts and
other states were stated to deserve “special solicitude” in standing
analysis,151 although also found to have satisfied the “most demanding
standards of the adversarial process.”152
Hence, because the Clean Air Act retained state latitude for
difference, and federalism doctrine relatedly allows such state
differences in policies and goals despite the “supremacy” of federal
law, Massachusetts and other states were able to sue, win, and elicit the
ruling that jump-started federal regulation of GHGs due to their climate
impacts.
The Massachusetts ruling set in motion several climate-directed
EPA regulatory actions. It also was built upon in the Supreme Court’s
decision in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,153 where the
Court held that federal public nuisance claims were preempted by the
Clean Air Act.154 But, in so ruling, the American Electric Power Court
reaffirmed the heart of the Massachusetts decision. Importantly, the
Court explained its decision as rooted in EPA’s power under the Clean
Air Act to regulate the existing power plants targeted by the common
law plaintiffs, referencing Section 111(d)’s grant of authority as “most
relevant” to its conclusion.155 That language subsequently became

147. Edward L Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 924 (1994) (distinguishing between mere
decentralization and federalist structures which leave room for direct policy differences
and ability to “choose different goals”).
148. See generally Trevor W. Morrison, The State Attorney General and
Preemption, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 5, at 81–89 (discussing state attorney
general roles and suggesting that, due to their democratic accountability, Congress and
courts should show “solicitude” for their roles rather than mandate or find preemption).
149. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
150. Id. at 517–21, 527–28.
151. Id. at 519–20.
152. Id. at 521.
153. 64 U.S. 410 (2011).
154. Id. at 415–20, 422–24.
155. Id. at 411–12.
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central to the Obama Administration’s development and defense of the
CPP described below.
Despite the Supreme Court’s 2006 Massachusetts decision, EPA
only made faltering responsive steps late in the Bush Administration.
Early in the Obama Administration, however, EPA began to respond. It
moved from an extensively documented Endangerment Finding about
risks of climate change to the remarkable “car deal” that was issued
with industry, state, and federal agreement to future auto emissions
reductions to comply with transportation and environmental laws.156
Then EPA issued the “Tailoring Rule” that sought to regulate existing
stationary sources of large volumes of GHG emissions under the Act’s
Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program.157 That regulation was
partly struck down by the Supreme Court in the Utility Air Regulatory
Group (UARG)158 case, but most large emitters remained subject to
regulation.159
Hence, triggered by state litigation, three Supreme Court decisions
affirmed EPA power to regulate GHG emissions and, due to statutory
language and the state of science, that translated into obligations of
EPA to act. But EPA met with nonstop regulatory, judicial, and
legislative opposition, as explicated more fully below.
In 2009 and 2010, the White House and allies in Congress decided
to make a legislative push for a climate-tailored federal law.160
Although climate bills had from time to time been proposed prior to
2009, none was close to politically viable. In 2009 and 2010, however,
ever stronger science and Democratic majorities in Congress and a
Democratic president in the White House improved the odds of
passage. Democrats and a few wavering Republicans considered several
climate bills, including one that passed in the House.
The leading bills were based on a cap-and-trade strategy, although
they included an array of other regulatory strategies as well.161 The
156. See Freeman supra note 118 and accompanying text.
157. Clean Air Act Permitting for Greenhouse Gases, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/nsr/clean-air-act-permitting-greenhouse-gases
[https://perma.cc/E8H9-5J5A].
158. Util. Air Reg. Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
159. Id. at 2444–46. The Court allowed EPA to regulate sources already
regulated under the PSD program.
160. For a recounting of this legislative push and underlying political and
economic dynamics, see ERIC POOLEY, THE CLIMATE WAR (2010).
161. The leading bills were the American Clean Energy and Security Act of
2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) (known as the Waxman-Markey Bill), the Clean
Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009) (the Boxer-Kerry
Bill), and the American Power Act, 111th Cong. (2010) (another later bill publicly
floated by Senators John Kerry and Joseph Lieberman). For a website with links to
these bills, related analyses, and recounting of their political path, see Congress
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bills’ cap-and-trade design was modeled on the Clean Air Act’s acid
rain cap-and-trade successes and subsequent cap-and-trade climate laws
enacted at the state level.162 Because the earlier Clean Air Act cap-andtrade program was embraced by market-oriented scholars and think
tanks and enacted as part of Clean Air Act amendments signed by
President George H.W. Bush, a Republican, the bills’ champions hoped
for a bipartisan support. And some prominent industry actors saw a
federal bill as a means to eliminate, through preemption, growing and
disparate state regulation.163
The leading House (Waxman-Markey) and Senate (Boxer-Kerry)
bills differed in some of their details, but in many respects shared
similar architecture and regulatory strategies. Their key provisions
would have set up a GHG cap-and-trade regime, under which GHG
allowances and offset credits could have been bought and sold,
provided the aggregate GHG levels stayed below a declining, federally
set cap.164 In addition, an array of other measures would have either
mandated or encouraged lower pollution by large emitters,165 greater
efficiency of energy-draining appliances,166 and smarter uses of
transportation and urban planning.167 Other provisions would have
rewarded technological innovations that help address climate change
causes and resulting harms.168
The bills met with fierce opposition, mostly along partisan lines.
Despite the strong science, the very reality of climate change continued
to be questioned and mocked.169 And the use of a market-based form of
regulation did not allay opponents, many of whom characterized the
bills as federal central planning and evidence of an overbearing federal
government.170
Even among supporters, a fierce debate ensued over the federalism
choices: what state roles should remain after enactment of federal
climate legislation? At the end of the day, no comprehensive federal

Climate Change History, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS,
https://www.c2es.org/content/congress-climate-history/
[https://perma.cc/X962GEVB].
162. See supra note 160.
163. See supra notes 111–35 (recounting these arguments)
164. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 704, 724, 781–82 (2009); S. 1733, 111th
Cong. §§ 771–77 (2009).
165. S. 1733 §§ 703, 722.
166. See S. 1733 § 619; H.R. 2454 §§ 211–19.
167. S. 1733 § 831.
168. S. 1733 §§ 113, 143, 152; H.R. 2454 §§ 123–24.
169. See POOLEY, supra note 160 (recounting fights over climate legislation).
170. See MAYER, supra note 86, at 198–225 (recounting funding of opposition
and coordination of opposition tactics).
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climate and energy law was enacted. Drafting choices and public debate
and analysis, however, illuminated federalism choices and institutional
pluralism in leading bills and some proposed amendments.
Early legislative talking points revealed an initial assumption that a
federal climate law would broadly preempt state and local climatedirected regulation. Legislators’ comments, as well as comments of
leading supportive industry actors, confirmed this preference and initial
assumption, as reviewed above.171 However, many states were already
tackling climate change with their own state and regional plans and
opposed such broad preemption.172
The final and most viable bills ended up largely preserving the
power of state and local governments to take their own additional
actions to address climate change, with the major exception that for six
years states could not adopt or implement their own cap-and-trade
climate law; during that period, only a federal cap-and-trade regime
would have existed.173 Thus, there would have been a federal cap-andtrade market, but states could have continued regulating GHGs through
other regulatory strategies.174
Both to clarify what states could do at any time and avoid the risk
of regulatory leakage, where one state’s emissions reductions might just
move elsewhere, the leading bills confirmed that states could retire
GHG allowances or charge more allowances per unit of GHG
emissions.175 The net effect of the leading bills would have been the
broad preservation of state authority.
The climate bills would thus have acted as a regulatory “floor,”
prohibiting states from pursuing a strategy of greater laxity.176 In short,
with the significant exception of the time-limited cap-and-trade
preemptive period, states could clamp down on polluters more than
federally required, could have pursued other climate-related regulation,
but would not have had the option to allow additional pollution.

171. See supra notes 111–34 and accompanying text (discussing preemption
arguments during this period and in 2017).
172. See Morford, supra note 126. Many states further showed their support
for climate regulation when they supported the CPP in comments and later litigation
briefs. See infra at notes 242–45 and accompanying text.
173. S. 1733 § 125; H.R. 2454 § 335.
174. S. 1733 §§ 124–125; H.R. 2454 §§ 334–335.
175. S. 1733 §§ 124–125; H.R. 2454 §§ 334–335.
176. William W. Buzbee, Clean Air Dynamism and Disappointments: Lessons
for Climate Change Legislation to Prompt Innovation and Discourage Inertia, 32
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 33, 44–45 (2010).
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A slightly late Kerry-Lieberman bill was unsuccessfully pitched to
elicit co-sponsorship by Republican Lindsay Graham.177 Although press
and legislator statements seemed to presage a much more unitary,
federal-government-only sort of regime, it was similar to the other
bills. 178 It too languished.
However, given the substantial similarities in the designs and
choices in these three bills, they probably will be the starting point for
any future cap-and-trade based climate legislative proposals. And while
the 2017 “tax-and-dividend” proposal was only described in outline
form, it too raised the specter of another push to preempt state law and
reverse Clean Air Act-based climate regulation.179
Due to the absence of any enacted climate-tailored statute, federal
climate action has had to rely on the Clean Air Act as last amended in
1990. Those subsequent regulatory developments, as well as the climate
regulatory recoil commenced by the Trump Administration, reveal the
benefits of federalism hedging facilitated by the Clean Air Act’s
federalism choices and energy laws’ retention of overlapping or
concurrent federal and state roles.
C. The Clean Power Plan’s Emergence and Battles: 2014–17
Throughout and subsequent to the failed legislative push, the
dynamics of federal hedging were apparent in the ongoing efforts of
states and EPA to promulgate climate regulation and support clean
energy innovations. The highest visibility and most embattled federal
climate proposal during the Obama administration was presented in the
CPP.180 It was explicitly built upon progress and innovations of the
states and businesses and was designed to further harness state tailoring
and state latitude for cost-effective market-based regulatory strategies.
The CPP was finalized in 2015.181 Its most important elements
targeted GHG emissions from existing power plants.182 The generative
177. Richard Cowan, Senator Graham Criticizes Climate Bill, REUTERS (May
25, 2010, 8:30 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/05/25/us-climate-usa-grahamidUKTRE64O06U20100525 [https://perma.cc/TD38-D2VH].
178. David A. Fahrenthold, Kerry, Graham, Lieberman Announce a “Dual
Track”
on
the
Climate
Bill,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
4,
2009),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/capitolbriefing/2009/11/kerry_graham_lieberman_announc.html
[https://perma.cc/E36W5U5N].
179. See supra note 114–16 (citing and describing the tax-and-dividend
proposals of James Baker and other self-described “conservatives” with Republican
affiliations).
180. See CPP, supra note 10 (citing the CPP final regulation and preamble in
the Federal Register).
181. Id. at 64662.
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benefits of overlapping and intertwined federal and state authority—a
key attribute of federalism hedging—is evident in how EPA set its CPP
emissions caps. Because Section 111(d) requires existing source
regulation to be based on the “best system of emissions reduction
adequately demonstrated,” EPA’s regulation had to be based on the
best actually achievable levels of emissions reduction.183 Section 111(d)
also includes an explicit cross-reference to Section 110, the Clean Air
Act’s State Implementation Plan section, making clear that that Section
111(d) is supposed to use a similar “procedure.”184
Rather than looking at each plant in isolation—an approach that
state and fossil fuel opponents of the CPP favored and labeled the
“inside the fenceline” approach—EPA looked at statutory language
calling for an assessment of “systems” to reduce power plant
emissions.185 EPA hence considered levels of reduction already
achieved by states and regions using energy and emissions tradingbased strategies. In EPA’s view, it was actually “demonstrated,” as
required by the statute. This approach, built on state-led innovations
developed during periods of federal gridlock or faltering progress,
justified substantially lower caps than would have been set looking at
each power plant on its own.
This EPA statutory interpretation of Section 111(d) —namely that
it authorized regulatory pollution caps set with reference to state and
utilities already utilizing variants on cap-and-trade regulation and other
clean energy initiatives—was actually consistent with extensive 2004
industry advocacy of cap-and-trade based regulation under Section
111(d). Industry associations championed cap-and-trade based
regulation under the very same provision in supporting the George W.
Bush Administration’s proposal to regulate mercury emissions from
power plants via a cap-and-trade program under Section 111(d) rather
than under Clean Air Act Section 112.186
182. Id. at 64724.
183. Id. at 64663.
184. For closer analysis of these interrelated provisions, see Buzbee, supra
note 19, at 463–77.
185.
CPP, supra note 10, at 64723–27, 64758–60, 64768–69 (preamble
explanation of final rule choices and discussion of reasons EPA rejected limiting its
emissions limitation to “inside the fenceline” assessments due to “integrated” electricity
system and established industry practices); EPA, LEGAL MEMORANDUM
ACCOMPANYING CLEAN POWER PLAN FOR CERTAIN ISSUES 5–10, 118–19, 128 (2015),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-11/documents/cpp-legal-memo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D3GJ-GV6G] (further discussing basis for regulating based on more
than “on-site” capacities, including past utility industry advocacy of regulation similar
to CPP).
186. See, e.g., Electric Power Supply Association, Comment Letter on the
Proposed Mercury Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 4652 (Jan. 30, 2004), and EPA’s Supplemental

BUZBEE – FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1080

1/19/2018 2:49 PM

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

A further benefit of concurrent and independent state authority was
harnessed in the CPP’s menu of compliance options. While existing
utilities could choose to achieve necessary reductions through plantspecific improvements, the CPP’s language created incentives for a
national embrace of energy and pollution trading, but via states making
such a choice.187
The regulatory design of the CPP is notable in its embrace of state
and utility innovations. The CPP’s intertwining of federal regulation
and state leadership has a seemingly paradoxical but beneficial impact.
Without mandating anything other than performance results, but by
allowing and actually encouraging continued state and utility use of
pollution trading linked to energy production, the CPP embraced
flexibility and cost-effective technological change and business
arrangements.188 This design was crafted to reduce resistance to
regulation and also harness constituencies invested in clean energy
progress and linked business opportunities.189
In addition, if the CPP were implemented, more regulators and
businesses would step into the clean energy and linked pollution
reduction realm. If this continued to grow as a business model,
additional regulators, businesses, and consumers would find reason to
resist unsettling webs of relationships. By avoiding blunt mandates or
rigid regulatory tools that would fit nobody and that also would create
Notice, 69 Fed. Reg. 12398 (Mar. 16, 2004) (Apr. 30, 2004),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-0056-2224
[https://perma.cc/AW6D-XD8U] (calling a cap-and-trade program “the best approach
for the power sector” because it is “cost-effective,” provides “flexibility,” creates
“incentives” to “accelerate . . . environmental benefits” and arguing against “unitspecific” regulation); see EPA, Response to Significant Public Comments on the Clean
Air Mercury Rule (March 15, 2005) at 5-1–5-5 (summarizing many supportive industry
comments).
187. CPP, supra note 10 at 64723, 64727-33, 64783, 64840 (reviewing ways
CPP was built on the integrated grid and state and utility flexibility and existing
accomplishments in meeting energy and environmental requirements and, for
compliance, would provide states and utilities many means to comply with the CPP).
For more in-depth exploration of how statutory structures retaining roles for state and
federal governments have led to regulatory progress during a time of legislative
gridlock, see Buzbee, supra note 19. For discussion of the regulatory petition and
Supreme Court litigation leading to Massachusetts, see id. at 463–68.
188. CPP, supra note 10 at 64,727-33, 64,767, 64,783, 64,840 (reviewing
ways CPP provides states and utilities choices and flexibility in devising means of
compliance).
189. Businesses and states did indeed support the CPP. See infra notes 241–46
and accompanying text. EPA explicitly referenced its goal of encouraging technological
and business innovations that would reduce GHG pollution. See CPP, supra note 10, at
64, 775–76. Even opponents of how EPA derived the CPP’s pollution limitation asked
EPA to allow utilities and states to rely on those very strategies to ease compliance
costs and burdens and maximize flexibility. Id. at 64, 784–85.
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little or no room for comparative advantage, the CPP was crafted to
draw new players into the regulatory effort and create business
opportunities.
Nonetheless, from 2015 through 2017, many of the same groups
that in 2004 had advocated power plant cap-and-trade regulation under
the very same Section 111(d) reversed themselves, claiming that not
only did EPA lack such power, but that consideration of trading
regimes was an egregious power grab.190 Challengers mounted a fierce
assault on the CPP that itself heavily relied on federalism. Challengers
argued that alleged impingements on traditional state regulatory turf
should lead to loss of deference to EPA’s law interpretation
judgments.191 The level of vitriol directed at EPA and the Obama
administration over this regulation was extraordinary, as was the
Supreme Court’s completely unprecedented decision to stay the
finalized rule.192 This stay was legally questionable, but provides
another strong indication of ongoing regulatory reversal risks.
And, as mentioned earlier, during 2017 the Trump administration
overtly declared the goal of dismantling the CPP and started down that
path; it also commenced efforts to reverse other climate regulatory
initiatives.193 Whether these reversals will succeed remains to be seen,
but additional federal progress combatting climate change is highly
unlikely during this administration.
D. Clean Energy Growth, Federalism, and Regulatory Signals
The CPP, if it comes into effect, would broaden private and
governmental clean energy investment and build likely support for its
regulatory design. But the CPP is far from the only catalyst for clean
energy and GHG reduction progress. In fact, it was built on clean
energy and GHG emission reduction investments that were incentivized
by governmental grants, subsidies, loans, and federal and state energy
and tax policies that made a shift to clean energy profitable for
investors, at least as a stable source of returns or a tax-reduction

190. The Bush administration mercury regulation, which embraced these
industry calls for a trading-based regime, was rejected in court due to EPA’s failure to
delist mercury as a hazardous substance using the process provided by Section 112.
New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The court did not address EPA’s
authority to regulate under Section 111(d) through a cap-and-trade strategy. Id.
191. See Buzbee, supra note 19, at 464.
192. See Lisa Heinzerling, The Supreme Court’s Clean-Power Power Grab, 28
GEO. ENVTL. L.J. 425, 430 (2016) (questioning Court’s authority to take such action).
193. See supra note 11 (reviewing Trump administration directives and
proposals to reverse climate regulations promulgated during the Obama administration).
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strategy.194 The shift of the clean energy sector from a largely policydependent investment to a viable and competitive sector is directly
linked to the latitude for state and federal overlap and intertwined
activity that is an essential element of federalism hedging.
Despite the clean energy progress traced below, policy shifts
remain essential to bring market signals into closer congruence with
societal impacts of energy-linked pollution.195 First and most obviously,
subsidies for the fossil fuel sector need to be eliminated or greatly
reduced and GHG emissions subject to some sort of Pigouvian taxes or
comprehensive regulation that functions like a tax. Such emissions are
still largely unpriced, at least at the federal level.196 When fossil fuels
and products generated with fossil fuels are sold with prices benefited
by subsidies or untaxed harms, those prices skew market activity and
disadvantage clean energy alternatives.197
Nevertheless, states embracing renewable portfolio standards
created demand for such cleaner energy.198 Linked businesses emerged,

194. For a review essay discussing policy support for “clean tech,” see David
Rotman, Cash for Infrastructure, TECH. REV., Sept.–Oct. 2010, at 100, 100–02. Some
of this shift is also attributable to private sector programs that reward reduced emissions
of GHGs. See Sarah E. Light, The New Insider Trading: Environmental Markets Within
the Firm, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 36–37 (2015).
195. See David M. Hart, Rescuing the Low-Carbon Energy Transition From
Magical Thinking, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://itif.org/publications/2016/10/27/rescuing-low-carbon-energy-transition-magicalthinking [https://perma.cc/9QX2-QGKQ] (stating government must lead to produce
innovations and emissions reductions needed); see also Christa Marshall, Bold
Initiatives Needed to Reach U.S. Climate Goals—Report, E&E NEWS (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060044919/
[https://perma.cc/255LEFWH] (summarizing Hart report).
196. For additional discussion of fossil fuel subsidies and need for corrective
policy changes, see supra notes 103–10, infra note 197, and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 103–10 and accompanying text; see also Chris Wold et
al., Leveraging Climate Change Benefits Through World Trade Organizations: Are
Fossil Fuel Subsidies Actionable?, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 635, 637 (2012) (calculating
fossil fuel subsidies and resulting market distortions); Tracey M. Roberts, Picking
Winners and Losers: A Structural Examination of Tax Subsidies to the Energy Industry,
41 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 63, 137 (2016).
198. See Amy L. Stein, Renewable Energy Through Agency Action, 84 U.
COLO. L. REV. 651, 679 (2013) (discussing state renewable portfolio standard
mandates); see also Renewable and Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards, CTR. FOR
ENERGY & CLIMATE SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/policymaps/renewable-energy-standards [https://perma.cc/LL4E-G4T3] (providing an
interactive map of all the states with renewable portfolio standards); State Climate and
Energy Maps: Renewable Portfolio Standards, GEO. CLIMATE CTR.,
http://www.georgetownclimate.org/clean-energy/state-energy-profiles-and-datamaps.html?criteria=renewable_portfolio_standards
[https://perma.cc/WXC3-D2H7]
(same).
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as did advances in clean energy technology.199 But when a state or the
nation reversed course, such clean energy businesses for years suffered
severe setbacks.200
When United States congressional support grew in 2009 and 2010
for comprehensive climate cap-and-trade legislation, interest in linked
clean energy businesses grew further.201 A new market exchange that
had recently been created, the Chicago Climate Exchange, was poised
to service this new market.202 When that congressional movement came
to a halt, however, values of clean and renewable energy companies
and providers of linked services dropped dramatically.203 Investment
banks and trading firms that had begun to create linked divisions and
products scaled back or shut them down.204 The Chicago Exchange
went out of business.205 Similarly, when federal and state tax credits for
clean and renewable energy initiatives were imperiled or for periods of

199. See Heather Payne, A Tale of Two Solar Installations: How Electricity
Regulations Impact Distributed Generation, 38 U. HAW. L. REV. 135, 141 (2016)
(linking growth in solar energy states with renewable energy mandates); see also
Research Shows Demonstrable Benefits from State Renewable Energy Portfolio
Standards, ENERGY DESIGN UPDATE, Feb. 2016, at 9, 9 (same).
200. See Alex Rice Kerr, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. &
PO’LY J. 69, 72–73 (2010); Ryan Wiser et al., Using the Federal Production Tax Credit
to Build a Durable Market for Wind Power in the United States, ELECTRICITY J., Nov.
2007, at 77, 80 (observing “tight and frenzied windows of development” and “boomand-bust cycles in renewable energy development” due to lack of stable policy).
201. See Tseming Yang, The Problem of Maintaining Emission “Caps” in
Carbon Trading Programs without Federal Government Involvement: A Brief
Examination of the Chicago Climate Exchange and the Northeast Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative, 17 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 255 (2008).
202. Trading Hot Air: A New Approach to Global Warming, ECONOMIST (Oct.
17, 2002), http://www.economist.com/node/1392773 [https://perma.cc/9UJH-JKSL]
(reporting business voluntary commitments to reduce GHG emission and creation of the
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX)).
203. See David R. Wooley & Elizabeth M. Morss, Clean Air Act Handbook: A
Practical Guide to Compliance § 10:24 (2015) (discussing CCX ending its GHG
emission allowances trading program following failed legislation).
204. See Larry Bell, The Chicago Climate Club Gets Capped, FORBES (Dec.
22, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/2010/12/22/chicago-climate-clubcarbon-barack-obama-opinions-contributors-larry-bell.html
[https://perma.cc/T7237AP6] (reporting CCX shutdown due to legislative and Democratic party congressional
losses).
205. Nathanial Gronewold, Chicago Climate Exchange Closes Nation’s First
Cap-and-Trade System but Keeps Eye to the Future, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/01/03/03climatewire-chicago-climate-exchangecloses-but-keeps-ey-78598.html?pagewanted=all
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160412050514/http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/0
1/03/03climatewire-chicago-climate-exchange-closes-but-keeps-ey78598.html?pagewanted=print] (exploring reasons for market’s closure).

BUZBEE – FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1084

1/19/2018 2:49 PM

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

time nonexistent,206 businesses in that sector and linked investment
vehicles (such as green funds), experienced drops in market value.207
The arrival of cheap natural gas due to fracking also hurt clean energy
investments.208
Nonetheless, many states and other nations stuck with their clean
energy efforts and climate change regulation.209 Moreover, the United
States Supreme Court’s several decisions affirming federal power to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions set in motion the federal regulatory
initiatives described above to limit such emission from motor vehicles,
stationary sources, and from new and existing power plants, with more
regulation in the pipeline.210 FERC policy shifts also provided a boost
for such initiatives.211
As a result, clean energy businesses continued to invest, gain
experience, innovate, and improve their technologies.212 The federal
Department of Energy also provided research and financial support.
Prices for wind and solar power continued to drop and installations
grow.213 The palatability and sophistication of regulatory work
206. See, e.g., supra note 200 (discussing the effect the PTC’s periodic nonrenewal on wind industry investments).
207. Id.
208. Mason Inman, Shale Gas: A Boon That Could Stunt Alternatives, Study
Says,
NAT.
GEO.
(Jan.
17,
2012),
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/01/120117-shale-gas-boomimpact-on-renewables/ [https://perma.cc/FM9R-E95Y].
209. See Bruce M. Pendery, Generating Electricity with Natural Gas: It’s
Plentiful and Cheap, but Regulations Is Needed to Prevent Environmental Degradation,
32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 253, 257–58 (2012) (discussing natural gas advantages and
ongoing reasons for movement towards renewable energy).
210. Elise Korican, Note, Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency,
Exploring the Merits of Greenhouse Gas Regulation, 28 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L.
JUDICIARY 193, 233 (2008) (reporting that “automotive industry . . . increase[d] fuel
efficiencies out of fear of future stringent EPA regulations”).
211. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text (discussing FERC order
supporting wholesale demand response markets).
212. See Diane Cardwell, Wind Industry’s New Technologies Are Helping It
Compete
on
Price,
N.Y.
TIMES
(March
20,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/21/business/energy-environment/wind-industrysnew-technologies-are-helping-it-compete-on-price.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20171208160332/https:/www.nytimes.com/2014/03/21/b
usiness/energy-environment/wind-industrys-new-technologies-are-helping-it-competeon-price.html] (discussing innovations in the wind industry); Peter Behr, Closing in on
a
Solar
Power
Breakthrough,
E&E
NEWS
(Oct.
21,
2016),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060044628 [https://perma.cc/RA42-QCNT] (reporting
innovations in the solar industry).
213. See Diane Cardwell, Solar and Wind Energy Start to Win on Price vs.
Conventional
Fuels,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
23,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/business/energy-environment/solar-and-windenergy-start-to-win-on-price-vs-conventional-fuels.html
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underpinning such clean energy initiatives contributed to an ever-more
stable and profitable market, despite headwinds from regulatory
setbacks and the ongoing availability of cheap natural gas.214 Still,
renewable energy efforts in the United States, feed-in-tariffs in Europe,
and governmental supports and mandates in China collectively built
momentum and fostered technological advances and reductions in prices
for clean and renewable energy technologies.215
Years of policy support and business investment have transformed
the clean energy sector.216 Costs of wind, energy storage, efficiency
measures, and solar have dropped substantially and are now
competitive or cheaper than fossil fuel-based energy.217 The number of
companies and employees now in clean energy-linked business has
skyrocketed.218 In fact, recent Department of Energy reports document
that clean energy employment—mostly falling into the low carbon
energy, solar, wind, and energy efficiency areas—now exceeds oil, gas,
and coal extraction employment.219 These reports also reference the

[https://web.archive.org/web/20171208161046/https:/www.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/b
usiness/energy-environment/solar-and-wind-energy-start-to-win-on-price-vsconventional-fuels.html].
214. See Gary Litvak, Full Steam Ahead: Renewable Energy Gains Momentum,
Despite Falling Oil, WEISERMAZARS LEDGER, June 2016, at 10, 12 (stating that the
“renewable energy industry in the United States has reached a critical mass” and can
secure “capital from the investors and lending institutions”).
215. See Mark Wu & James Salzman, The Next Generation of Trade and
Environment Conflicts: The Rise of Green Industrial Policy, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 401,
403–07 (2014).
216. See Christopher Dann et al., Renewables at a Crossroads, 149 PUB. UTIL.
FORT. 42, 43 (2011) (tracing renewable energy growth to policy support); see also
Kerr, supra note 200, at 73 (same).
217. For one recent comparative assessment of types of energy and their costs
without subsidies, see LAZARD, LAZARD’S LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS—
VERSION 9.0 at 4, 14, 19 (2015) (finding that on an unsubsidized basis, numerous
“alternative generation technologies” are “cost-competitive with conventional
generation technologies;” study also includes comparisons of effects of subsidies,
changing fuel prices, and carbon abatement costs); see also Diane Cardwell, Capacity
of Wind Power Surpasses Hydroelectric, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2017, at B2 (reporting
massive increase in wind power capacity and also reporting Department of Labor
prediction that “wind service technician” would be the nation’s “fastest growing
occupation over the next decade”).
218. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY AND EMPLOYMENT REPORT 8–10 (2017).
219. Id. (executive summary reporting these overall conclusions and trends);
id. at 21 (reporting changes in the nation’s energy mix and providing a breakdown of
employment numbers and trends); DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY AND EMPLOYMENT
REPORT 7–9 (2016) (summarizing findings and providing data on employment in
various sectors).
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rapid increases in employment linked to energy efficiency, wind, and
solar energy.220
It is clear that by 2016, and even into 2017, the ongoing existence
and competitiveness of such businesses have ceased to be wholly
dependent on regulatory policy.221 When the CPP, for example, met
with its unexpected regulatory stay issued by the Supreme Court, clean
energy markets barely reacted.222 Many states, their electricity sector,
and public utility commissions continued with efforts to structure
effective regimes supporting clean power production.223 Green energy-

220. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 218; DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 219.
221. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 219.
222. See Thad Huetteman & Laura Martin, Clean Power Plan Accelerates the
Growth of Renewable Generation Throughout United States, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (June 17, 2016), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=26712
[https://perma.cc/F59U-6H88] (stating that “even without the CPP, significant growth
in renewables generation is projected . . . due in large part to Congress’s recent
extension of favorable tax treatment for renewable energy sources”); John Larsen et
al., What Happens to Renewable Energy Without the Clean Power Plan?, RHODIUM
GROUP (Feb. 25, 2016), http://rhg.com/notes/renewable-energy-without-the-cleanpower-plan [https://perma.cc/7P4B-7DJQ] (finding that even were the CPP to be
rejected, “tax extenders alone provide a bigger medium-term boost to renewables than
just the CPP, but not as big as with both policies in place”); ETHAN HOWLAND, CQ
ROLL CALL, REPORT: TAX BREAKS OUTWEIGH CLEAN POWER PLAN (2016) (stating that
“[r]ecently extended federal tax breaks for renewable generation are more important to
spur” renewables growth than the CPP); NREL Analysis Finds Tax Credit Extensions
Can Impact Renewable Energy Deployment and Electric Sector CO2 Dmissions, NAT’L
RENEWABLE
ENERGY
LAB.
(Feb.
22,
2016),
http://www.nrel.gov/news/press/2016/22645 [https://perma.cc/YXF8-KJ2B] (citing
Trieu Mai et al., Impacts of Federal Tax Credit Extensions on Renewable Deployment
and Power Sector Emissions, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., i, iv (Feb. 22, 2016)
for evidence of ongoing link of tax policies to renewables investment).
223. See Hannah J. Wiseman & Hari M. Osofsky, Regional Energy
Governance and U.S. Carbon Emissions, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 143, 210–11 (2016)
(discussing varied state responses to CPP stay); Rod Kuckro, New England Says No to
Natural Gas, Yes to Renewables, E&E NEWS (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060044883/print
[https://perma.cc/5HWX-EMJE]
(discussing ongoing plans for seven solar and wind projects); Benjamin Hulac, R.I.
Department Unveils $17M for Efficiency, Renewables, E&E NEWS (Aug. 12, 2016),
https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060041527/print
[https://perma.cc/6XWV-39QK] (discussing ongoing support for renewables); see also
E&E’s
Power
Plan
Hub,
E&E
NEWS,
http://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan#planning_status
[https://perma.cc/8HUK-V8BS] (infographic summarizing state response to CPP
following SCOTUS’ stay); Jocelyn Durkay, States’ Reactions to EPA Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Standards, NAT’L CONFERENCE ST. LEGIS. (April 18, 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/states-reactions-to-proposed-epa-greenhouse-gasemissions-standards635333237.aspx [https://perma.cc/4H93-ET9R] (summarizing state
response to CPP following Court’s stay).

BUZBEE – FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017:1037

1/19/2018 2:49 PM

Federalism Hedging

1087

linked funds did not tank.224 Sellers of solar power products continued
to see increasing market demand.225 Companies like the Southern
Company ceased opposing distributed solar energy.226 Utilities that had
successfully sought state-level public utility commission approval of
clean energy investments now oppose commission reversals.227 Which
companies and business models will emerge as market winners remains
highly uncertain, but the challenge now is about winning in an
increasingly competitive business that is undergoing a rapid change; the
hurdle is not a technological impossibility or uncompetitive costs of the
underlying technology. 228
The unexpected 2016 election of Donald Trump as president
despite contrary polling further confirmed both the importance of
government policies to clean energy and the clean energy sector’s new
durability. Coal company stocks rebounded, while solar stocks

224. See Valay Shah et al., Tax Equity Financing of Alternative Energy, REAL
EST. FIN., Spring 2016, at 154 (discussing role of tax equity financing of clean energy);
see also ALICE C ORRELL ET AL., 2015 DISTRIBUTED WIND MARKET REPORT 18 (2016),
https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/08/f33/2015-Distributed-Wind-Market-Report08162016_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/UKF8-X2N4] (reporting on wind equity financing);
AARON SMITH ET AL., 2014-2015 OFFSHORE WIND TECHNOLOGIES MARKET REPORT 75
(2015), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/64283.pdf [https://perma.cc/HD87-BS9A]
(with information on particular projects); RYAN WISER ET AL., 2015 WIND
TECHNOLOGIES
MARKET
REPORT
vi–vii
(2016),
https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/08/f33/2015-Wind-Technologies-MarketReport-08162016.pdf [https://perma.cc/324Q-7CC4] (tracking and predicting tax equity
financing).
225.
U.S. Solar Market Set to Grow 119% in 2016, Installations to Reach 16
GW, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.seia.org/news/ussolar-market-set-grow-119-2016-installations-reach-16-gw
[https://perma.cc/Y8KKGF88].
226. Kristi E. Swartz, Southern Power's Slow-and-Steady Transformation,
E&E NEWS
(Sept.
8,
2016),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060042386
[https://perma.cc/JYJ4-6RHG]; Kristi E. Swartz, Georgia Power Won't Meet
Ambitious
Goal
for
Arrays,
E&E
NEWS
(Aug.
26,
2016),
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060042068/print
[https://perma.cc/7QWE-BMQX]; Sweet, supra note 141.
227. See, e.g., Jeff Stanfield, Ore. Clean Energy Groups, Utilities Agree to
Seek 50% RPS, Coal Phase-Out, SNL ENERGY RENEWABLE ENERGY WEEK, Jan. 15,
2016.
228. See LAZARD, supra note 217; Litvak, supra note 214; see also Sweet,
supra note 141 (discussing business and policy-driven reasons “power companies are
investing in more wind and solar farms”); Siemens Slashes 7,000 Jobs Amid Shift to
Renewables,
E&E
NEWS
(Nov.
17,
2017),
https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2017/11/17/stories/1060066847
[https://perma.cc/E2AX-TCJ8] (reporting on Siemens layoffs following reduced
demand for traditional utility turbines in light of rapid shift to renewables).
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dropped, but not to any devastating extent.229 Many states continue to
pursue their clean energy initiatives, and market watchers still see clean
energy as a sound investment; in fact, between the CPP’s final issuance
in 2015 and January 2017, clean energy trends accelerated more than
expected by EPA when crafting the CPP.230
Thus, despite the disadvantages faced by purveyors of clean
energy and linked products—namely subsidies for carbon extractive
businesses, unpriced carbon emissions, scattered and erratic subsidies
and tax incentives for clean energy, and several major federal
regulatory reversals of efforts to regulate carbon emissions—those
markets and business sectors survive and show less vulnerability to
regulatory setbacks.231 But an important caveat is necessary: these
ongoing state efforts and corporate clean energy progress still benefit
from federal and state tax advantages and purchase mandates in some
states.232
Hence, this confluence of federal regulation, state regulation,
aligned initiatives abroad, and technological and business advances have
combined to shift the competitiveness and affordability of clean energy.
Due to the ongoing embrace of regulatory concurrence that is a crucial
underpinning of federalism hedging, clean energy and climate progress
no longer wholly depend on any single government actor’s policy
support or any single policy. In short, progress made has shifted the
technology and markets. No single governmental actor can destroy the
complex web of regulation that catalyzed that progress, nor can any
single governmental actor unsettle deeply entrenched shifts in energy
production and resulting pollution reductions.
E. Regulatory Reversal Risks and Coalitional Entrenchment
This growing profitability of clean energy businesses and state
commitment to climate regulation and clean energy are favorable
229. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing effect of Trump’s
election on clean energy businesses).
230. See infra note 247 and accompanying text. On January 11, 2017, EPA,
still under the Obama Administration’s leadership, issued a substantial document
explaining the denial of petitions to reconsider the CPP. It reviewed how clean energy
trends have accelerated, how carbon emissions have dropped more and at lower cost
than expected, and reported that numerous jurisdictions and their utilities were already
accomplishing emissions reductions that were not anticipated until near the CPP’s
reduction target date of 2030. U.S. EPA ET AL., BASIS FOR DENIAL OF PETITIONS TO
RECONSIDER AND PETITIONS TO STAY THE CAA SECTION 111(D) EMISSION GUIDELINES
FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND COMPLIANCE TIMES FOR ELECTRIC UTILITY
GENERATING UNITS 1–3, 22–32 (2017).
231. See LAZARD, supra note 217; Litvak, supra note 214.
232. See supra note 231.
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developments for mitigating the causes of climate change. Federal level
policy reversals, however, still matter. After eight years of federal
momentum and more than a decade of state progress, federal policy
reversals look likely with the arrival of the Trump administration.233
Regulatory reversal risks are also posed by Congress.234 Congress
has for many years proposed to divest EPA of power to address climate
change and continues to do so in 2017.235 In fact, since the 2009 to
2010 flurry of unsuccessful legislative efforts to pass comprehensive
climate legislation, dozens of congressional bills addressed federal
authority to regulate pollutants or activities linked to climate change.236
Only a handful of such bills strengthened such authority.237 Instead, the
far more frequent bills have sought in some form to bar, defund, or
stay such efforts.238 For example, a 2017 short House bill “finds” that
EPA lacked the power to regulate GHG emissions and climate and, if
passed, would divest the agency of power to regulate GHGs as
pollutants under five specified laws.239 While unsuccessful as of the fall
of 2017, these bills confirm the insight that regulatory enactments are
subject to political reversal; even a string of decisions, regulatory
actions, and overwhelming supportive science seemingly in line with
explicit Supreme Court language will not prevent such efforts.240
But this is where federalism hedging’s great value becomes most
apparent. First, legislative, regulatory, and judicial challenges through
2016 mostly failed, with state and federal regulatory experience a
crucial variable. Second, the CPP, climate regulation, and clean energy
initiatives gained substantial state and industry support. These growing
coalitions that by 2017 support climate and clean energy regulation got

233. See Juliet Eilperin & Chelsea Harvey, Congress and Trump Have Begun
Reversing Multiple Obama Rules on the Environment—and More, WASH. POST (Feb. 1,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2017/02/01/congress-and-trump-have-begun-reversing-multipleobama-era-rules-on-the-environment-and-more/?utm_term=.dea60bdb8b70
[https://perma.cc/RZT7-HWKC].
234. Id.
235. Devin Henry, Lawmakers: Congress Has Not Given EPA Power to Enact
Climate Rule, HILL (Feb. 23, 2016, 12:34 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energyenvironment/270419-lawmakers-congress-has-not-given-epa-power-to-institute-climate
[https://perma.cc/69LE-R3NU].
236. Memorandum from the Georgetown Univ. Law Library Research Servs.
on Climate-Related Legislation (111-115th Congresses) to William W. Buzbee 4–7
(Mar. 2, 2017) (available upon request).
237. Id. at 8–9, 14–17, 33–35.
238. Id. at 9–14, 17–33, 35–44.
239. H.R. 637, 115th Cong. (2017).
240. See supra note 13 (discussing reversal risks); PATASHNIK, supra note 13,
at 17 (exploring post-enactment efforts to attack and shape implementation of a law).
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to that point due to recent decades’ web of state policy initiatives that,
coupled with federal incentives, collectively solidified the viability,
competitiveness, and regulatory efficacy of clean energy and climate
regulation and businesses developed to service these market and
regulatory demands.241
This new coalitional support was evident in CPP comments and
briefing. EPA explicitly justified the design of the CPP based on what it
observed in the states and among electric utilities.242 Many states,
businesses, and even some utilities submitted comments and later briefs
supporting the CPP.243 They were able to argue, based on actual
business and regulatory experience, that the measures assessed and
embraced in the CPP are already “business as usual,” and that the CPP
is by no means a radical or even burdensome proposal.244 State and
business supporters also argued that the CPP would create additional
business opportunities.245
Third, these state and business supporters of the CPP favored its
design due to how it would allow states and industry to tailor
compliance to their distinctive markets, energy profiles, and regulatory
structures.246 In those submissions, these state and industry CPP

241. For analysis both of development of green business viability and linked
coalition building, see Meckling et al., supra note 62, at 1170–71; Rodrik, supra note
62, at 471, 473, 483–85.
242. CPP, supra note 10, passim.
243. Brief for Intervenors Calpine Corp. et al., at 3, West Virginia v. EPA,
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1363) (the case is currently pending in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C Circuit).
244.
See Brief for State and Municipal Intervenors in Support of Respondents,
at 25–29, West Virginia v. EPA, (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1363) (arguing that CPP
builds on state and municipal efforts to combat climate change); Brief for National
League of Cities et al. Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, at 17–30, West Virginia
v. EPA, (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1363) (providing overview of cities’ adaptation and
mitigation efforts to combat climate change and arguing that vacatur of CPP will harm
these efforts); Brief for Intervenors Advanced Energy Economy et al., at 13–15, West
Virginia v. EPA, (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1363) (arguing that Building Block 2 of
CPP is reasonable because it reflects the power industry’s already occurring shift from
high-emitting generation to lower-emitting natural gas); Brief for Intervenors Calpine
Corp. et al., supra note 243, at 12–13 (same).
245. See Amici Curiae Brief of Sustainable Business Organizations in support
of Respondent, at 13–16, West Virginia v. EPA, (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1363)
(arguing that implementation of CPP will provide a net increase in jobs, gross state
product, and personal income); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Adobe Inc. et al. in
Support of Respondents, at 7–13, West Virginia v. EPA, (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 151363) (arguing that vacatur of CPP will harm the sustainability initiatives employed by
many major corporations and will make such corporations susceptible to price spikes
and other economic uncertainties plaguing the fossil fuel industry).
246. See Amici Curiae Brief of Sustainable Business Organizations in support
of Respondent, supra note 245, at 6 (arguing that CPP “employs a cooperative
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supported the CPP because of desire to reduce climate risks, but
repeatedly referenced how it built on existing investments and
practices. Because the CPP harnessed state-tested, cost-effective, and
flexible strategies to reduce GHG pollution, supportive invested
businesses and regulatory coalitions fought in its support.
Even if President Trump succeeds in undoing or weakening the
CPP, or Congress weakens federal law, the very practices and state
experiences on which the CPP was built remain. And since the CPP
was proposed, many utilities sought state public utility commission
approval for clean energy investments that will provide multiple longterm benefits, among them readiness to comply with a CPP, other
climate regulation, or to take advantage of or remain competitive in
light of FERC actions opening up the wholesale energy market sector to
greater competition and reduced pollution.247 Further clean energy
progress can be logical as a business and political matter, even without
a federal regulatory mandate.
And because cost-of-service approvals typically make utility
investments a source of guaranteed returns, and other FERC and state
measures also undergird the booming clean energy sector, it is doubtful
that a CPP reversal would lead to state-level reversals.248 Thus, even in
the short time since the CPP was finalized, further progress and
entrenchment of clean energy trends have occurred.249 A Trump
administration EPA revisiting the CPP in a way compliant with
established administrative law doctrine will have to examine business

federalism approach” that allows states to tailor compliance to their unique geography,
energy resources, and markets); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Grid Experts Benjamin
F. Hobbs et al., at 27–31, West Virginia v. EPA, (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1363)
(arguing that CPP provides states with a multitude of “familiar” alternatives for
compliance).
247. For sources discussing utility support for the plan, ongoing clean energy
plans, and progress towards meeting CPP goals with or without it, see, e.g., 2017 AEP
Corporate
Accountability
Report,
AM.
ELECTRIC
POWER,
http://aepsustainability.com/environment/regulations/carbon.aspx
[https://perma.cc/8X3Y-JJZ7]; John Downey, Duke Energy Wants N.C. to Open Up
Planning for EPA Carbon Mandate, CHARLOTTE BUS. J. (Feb. 1, 2016, 1:20 PM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/blog/energy/2016/01/duke-energy-wants-n-c-toopen-up-planning-for-epa.html [https://perma.cc/Z4F2-4APH]; Nicholas Bianco et al.,
Compliance with Clean Power Plan is Within Reach – Even for States Opposing It,
ENVTL.
DEF.
FUND.:
CLIMATE
411
(Sept.
21,
2016),
http://blogs.edf.org/climate411/2016/09/21/compliance-with-clean-power-plan-iswithin-reach-even-for-states-opposing-it/ [https://perma.cc/WC7P-KEMV].
248. See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text (discussing cost-of-service
based regulation and how it rewards utility projects with guaranteed returns).
249. See U.S. EPA ET AL., supra note 230 (in EPA’s denial of petitions to
reconsider the CPP, reviewing accelerating clean energy trends and reductions in
emissions and associated costs).
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and regulatory practices due to the Clean Air Act’s “best
demonstrated” formulation and also the obligation of all agencies to
engage with their past reasoning to survive hard look review.250 A
complete federal regulatory reversal is not certain, plus federal
compulsion of business and state abandonment of clean energy progress
is a virtual impossibility.
However, this is by no means a claim that climate progress will
proceed apace or that the loss of federal climate regulation is
unimportant. Federal recoil will constitute a major environmental
setback. Without a national CPP guideline or other climate regulation
initiatives, some states and utilities will remain clean energy laggards.
Other utilities enjoying the benefits of rate regulation will continue high
polluting approaches with little pressure to do better. All states will
worry about disadvantaging themselves. States with large coal or oil
and gas sectors may find that continued embrace of coal mining and use
and denigration of climate science and regulation is good politics and
locally advantageous, even if not economical or beneficial for most
states, utilities, consumers of electricity, health, or the environment.
After all, fossil fuel extraction, processing, shipping cause many
environmental and health harms apart from climate effects.251 From the
perspective of businesses involved in clean energy, it seems, the
rewards for such business models will dwindle without the CPP, but
will still be rewarded in many jurisdictions. The point is that due to
federalism hedging, expertise gained and coalitions built as a result of
state and federal concurrent authority ensure that federal regulatory
reversals will not be fatal or final.
The next Part links this regulatory and market change history to
the theory of federalism hedging, further showing how climate change’s
attributes make retention of overlapping regulatory authority especially
important to address an array of regulatory failures and reversal risks.

250. The CPP repeal proposal, however, barely addresses the many legal and
factual underpinnings of the CPP, leaving it vulnerable to eventual judicial rejection.
See Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, supra note 11. Agency
obligations to provide a reasoned explanation for a policy change are set forth in Encino
Motorcars v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (discussing and setting forth such
requirements, including agency obligation to provide “good reasons” and provide a
“reasoned explanation” for “disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were
engendered by the prior policy”) (citing cases and quoting portions of FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515–16 (2009)).
251. See U.S. EPA, supra note 81, at 4-1–4-2, 4-11–4-14, 4-22–4-36
(discussion of co-benefits of regulation).

BUZBEE – FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017:1037

1/19/2018 2:49 PM

Federalism Hedging

1093

IV. FEDERALISM HEDGING AND CLIMATE PROGRESS
If markets were perfect and regulatory implementation and
enforcement also flawless and stable, the arguments would be quite
strong for a unitary federal climate bill or comprehensive federal
regulation that preempted state climate regulatory authority. However,
once one relaxes the assumption of perfection and policy stability, then
the flaws of such unitary and preemptive federal regulation become
apparent. Retaining room for state climate and linked clean energy
regulation provides a valuable hedge against regulatory failure.
This Part builds on this Article’s history of climate regulation
battles and exploration of federalism hedging dynamics. It integrates
theories about federalism’s effects with theories pertaining to regulatory
learning via policy diffusion, coalitional entrenchment, especially the
literature on path dependence, all in the service of both understanding
the particulars of the climate regulatory challenge and more generally
illuminating federalism hedging dynamics. The answer to propreemption arguments hinges on regulatory error and derailment risks,
the market impacts of such risks, and how regulation that develops
sequentially and in an overlapping and interactive manner can provide a
resilient web of regulation for dependent markets. The existence (and
retention) of federalism hedging structures will also undergird future
efforts to enact more comprehensive national climate legislation or
regulation.
A. Federal Laxity Risks, Complementarity, and Catalysts
Probably the biggest risk of federal climate legislation or
regulation, especially legislation relying primarily on a cap-and-trade
strategy or another setting of a federal emissions cap, is that it would
prove too lax.252 (Although this Article returns to the tax versus capand-trade question later, it is worth noting here that an unduly low
Pigouvian tax would also create risks of ineffective federal regulation
and make state regulatory authority important.) A national carbon cap—
whether under legislation or a cap-like strategy via regulation like the
CPP—would only create substantial innovation incentives if its cap
were low enough to economically reward innovations reducing
emissions. Until a cap’s stringency is on the immediate horizon,
innovation incentives will be weak.253
252. Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade:
Moving Towards Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 396–97 (2009).
253. See David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading
Idea and the Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 1, 41–46
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The leading 2009 to 2010 cap-and-trade bills confirmed that this
risk of laxity is substantial.254 They proposed to hand out a huge
percentage of pollution allowances for free, to the largest polluters.255
The cap itself would not have kicked into effect for years, and the
leading bills required little for many years.256 In addition, GHG
allowances and offset credits could have been “banked.”257 Thus, if
they had been enacted, the leading bills’ minimal regulatory costs and
rewards for innovation would not have been felt for years. The CPP
was met with a deluge of criticism and lawsuits, but for many states
and utilities, its actual pollution caps were often unchallenging; recent
evidence indicates that substantial GHG emissions reductions at
moderate cost have already been made since 2015, even with the CPP
stayed by the courts.258 Hence, it too may have set a lax pollution cap.
Preserving state and local latitude to address causes of climate
change in the face of a lax federal law provides several benefits. First,
in the face of federal laxity, state and local action complements federal
efforts both directly and by supporting technological innovation. As
would have been allowed under the leading 2009 to 2010 climate bills,
states could retire carbon allowances or increase the price per unit of
GHG emitted. Or state and local governments might reduce emissions
from sources and sectors missed under a federal law, or require earlier
reductions. And while a perfect tax could correct market signals and
would decrease GHG emissions, getting that tax right is difficult.
Furthermore, allowing states (or EPA under earlier statutes) to continue
using old-fashioned “Best Available Technology” based performance
standards could at a far earlier date lead polluters to ratchet back GHG
emissions.259

(1998); David M. Driesen, Emissions Trading Versus Pollution Taxes: Playing Nice
With Other Instruments, 48 ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 8–10) (on file
with author).
254. For more complete description of the bills’ key provisions and designs,
see GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 1203–05, 1211.
255. Id. at 1204.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. CPP opposition briefs nowhere identified excess stringency. Supportive
briefs and the CPP Federal Register preamble discussed the reasonableness of the
targets. See discussion supra notes 242–48 and accompanying text. EPA’s January 2017
Basis for Denial, cited supra note 230, finds that the CPP substantially overestimated
the difficulty and costs of reducing GHG emissions.
259. Robert L. Glicksman, Balancing Mandate and Discretion in the
Institutional Design of Federal Climate Change Policy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY
196,
204–06
(2008),
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1088&cont
ext=nulr_online [https://perma.cc/NRT2-T5M3].
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Second, regulatory pressures of both sorts—earlier state emissions
reductions and earlier and unavoidable pollution reductions under
traditional performance standards— would create market rewards for
reduction strategies even if a federal target were lax. As seen in state
and business responses to the CPP, cost-effective and tested pollution
reduction and clean energy strategies will, over time, reduce resistance
to more comprehensive or stringent regulation.260 Each state and federal
initiative provides environmental benefits and educates both other
policymakers and constituencies about the implications of possibly
diverse strategy choices to achieve similar ends.261 As Professor
Carlson and researchers at MIT have demonstrated, cap-and-trade plus
complementary policies could lead overall costs of GHG reductions to
increase but still provide other benefits and address predictable forms of
market failure.262
A notable example of such experience-based suggestions for
regulatory design and improvement was evident in FERC’s
deliberations over its embrace of wholesale demand response markets;
numerous states and market monitors for multi-state energy
transmission markets drew on their experience to suggest ways to
ensure that this new wholesale market would function well.263
Allowing such state and local regulation does not mean that
leakage risks are altogether misguided; they would still exist, and that
risk surely discourages stringent regulation by any unit of government.
However, environmental compliance costs tend to be dwarfed by labor
costs and other location-dependent advantages.264 Thus, at the margins,
climate and energy-directed state regulation might modestly influence
locational choices, but an argument claiming that state regulation of
GHG emission would be an act of self-defeating regulatory futility is,
upon examination, overly strong.265
260. See supra notes 241–47 and accompanying text.
261. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 71, at 1522–23.
262. Designing Effective Climate Policy, supra note 5, at 35–40 (citing studies
from MIT and others predicting increased overall costs with cap-and-trade plus
complementary policies, but also predicting lowered carbon emissions).
263. Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy
Markets; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 16658, 16660 & nn.15–19 (March 24, 2011)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
264. See McAllister, supra note 252, at 396–97, 443–45; Porter & van der
Linde, supra note 96, at 120–22. The literature on leakage risks tends to find modest
levels of pollution movement or rebound, likely due to the greater importance of other
variables influencing production and pollution choices. See supra note 133. Of course,
disparate regulatory burdens over the long term would influence choices about the
movement of linked capital.
265. See Wiener, supra note 120, at 1967–76, 1979 (arguing the leakage and
futility points).
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Importantly, as is particularly evident in early 2017, whether due
to implementation failures or policy reversals, no federal regulation is
invulnerable to derailment.266 Under the non-preemptive regime created
under current law, if federal climate regulation remains lax in its
aggregate impacts, as is likely under the Trump administration, states
would still retain authority to take climate and clean energy-related
actions to address laxity and implementation risks. That very retained
possibility or reality of state regulation creates incentives for targets of
regulation to support a revised federal law or improved implementation
that would address a law that is ineffective due to its laxity.267 And
businesses in the clean energy sector have, over time, become
increasingly invested in the new status quo and will defend it, as seen in
climate legislation debates and later Clean Power Plan battles.
The value of retained, potentially overlapping federal and state
authority is especially evident if one imagines the changed political and
economic dynamics and incentives that would exist under a preemptive
federal law. If federal climate or clean energy laws were falling short
and in the hands of a hostile administration, but state climate actions
were preempted, then no one could turn to the states to press for action.
No other venue for climate action would exist unless a new federal law
re-empowered the states.
A derailed but still existing federal law with a broadly preemptive
effect hence could easily create a situation where no one could regulate
GHG emissions at all. For polluters and politicians whose ideal world
would include no regulation, a preemptive federal law would hence
create incentives for a massive investment in derailing federal law and
thereby altogether escaping or delaying regulation.
Just this sort of risk is evident now with the political alignments
and majorities enjoyed by Republicans in Congress and President
Trump starting in 2017. Republicans since 2008 have overwhelmingly
opposed climate regulation and denigrated climate science. Candidate
Trump did the same, calling it a “hoax.”268 It appears likely that
Republicans will not have numbers sufficient to overcome a filibuster,
but if one reexamines 2009 to 2010 climate federalism battles, the risks
of the proposed preemptive strategy become apparent.

266. See Engel & Saleska, supra note 92, at 224–28; Revesz, supra note 33, at
1244–47.
267. See supra note 74 (citing sources regarding catalyst theory).
268. Chris Cillizza, Donald Trump Doesn’t Think Much of Climate Change, in
20
Quotes,
CNN
(Aug.
8,
2017,
11:17
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/08/politics/trump-global-warming/index.html
[https://perma.cc/UL5S-C979]; see supra note 11 (citing articles discussing the views
of Trump and Pruitt regarding climate).
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Had climate legislation in 2010 passed with a preemptive “federal
only” structure advocated by prominent scholars and stakeholders, then
through an appropriations rider, other focused legislative maneuver, or
simple agency delay, Republicans and President Trump in 2017 likely
could have found ways to preclude or at least delay federal
implementation of any climate law and resulting regulation. No separate
action, however, would have been necessary to preclude state action if
the federal law already was preemptive. Congressional inertia or
opposition to re-empowering state climate authority would have left no
actor with climate authority. The result could have been no
government-led climate regulatory progress and likely efforts to squelch
state clean energy progress as preempted.269
However, because the most significant federal climate actions
between 2010 and 2016 were taken under the Clean Air Act, which
retains its strong savings clause preserving state authority to do more,
even complete federal paralysis via agency foot-dragging or a focused
legislative fix killing the CPP would not result in such a loss of state
authority. The next section further explores implementation and
regulatory reversal incentives and risks.
B. Risks of Implementation Failures and Policy Reversal
Risks of climate-related regulatory implementation failures and
policy reversals are substantial and would undercut innovation
incentives and climate progress. They are distinct from laxity risks
analyzed above, which focus on an undemanding environmental target.
By regulatory implementation failure, this Article alludes to failures to
implement a law after its enactment. Relatedly, policy reversals remain
a risk, as is especially apparent in 2017.
First, both to secure favorable regulation or simply delay the
effective date of regulatory burdens, industry targeted by any regulation
(be it in legislation or regulation) will vigorously participate in
regulatory venues. Even if industries benefited by climate regulation
tried to keep implementation on track, agencies implementing a federal
climate law might fall behind. Delay is among the most common and
pervasive form of regulatory implementation failures.270 Under the
leading 2009 to 2010 climate bills, hundreds of rulemakings and other

269. See infra notes 326–40 (reviewing federalism and preemption cases and
how lack of statutory clarity on federalism choices generates preemption and
constitutional challenges).
270. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and
Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 301–03,
315 (1999) (discussing delay among other forms of agency “slippage”).
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complicated regulatory tasks would have been required, many of which
would have led to regulatory challenges.271 Similarly, even if the CPP
survives court challenges and is not officially revoked via another
notice and comment rulemaking, foot-dragging in federal
implementation and state compliance is likely and hard to remedy.
Absent specific statutory mandates and deadlines, recent Supreme Court
cases make challenges to agency delay and inaction difficult. 272
Furthermore, even if regulatory infrastructure setting forth
mitigation obligations remained in place, GHG markets dependent on
regulation would also need effective monitoring and enforcement.
Especially if a federal climate law or regulation credited offset-linked
actions or relied on complex trading regimes, risks of illusory
beneficial activity would arise. If cheating were not caught or markets
simply became muddled and lacking in transparency, the market could
collapse. Retaining state authority, and ideally also state and citizen
enforcement of federal law, might help preserve the integrity of
regulation-dependent markets.
As noted in connection with the laxity scenario, under a
preemptive law or regulation, even if that federal climate law or
regulation were exemplary in its goals and strategies, polluters opposed
to such regulation would have heightened incentives to cause such
implementation delays, regulatory failures, or secure a policy reversal.
They would undoubtedly engage in the sort of “blood sport” regulatory
attacks analyzed by Professor McGarity.273 In fact, the regulatory
payoff for regulatory obstruction at the federal level would be greater if
that derailment promised a complete escape from regulation.274
In contrast, if federal climate regulation implementation delays or
enforcement laxity did not cause a regulatory vacuum, but would revive
more rigorous or diverse forms of state regulation, then affected
industry might reluctantly support more effective federal law over a
wave of potentially disparate or stringent state regulation. Relatedly, if

271. Sharon Tompkins et al., Litigating Global Warming: Likely Legal
Challenges to Emerging Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Programs in the United
States, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10389, 10390 (2009).
272. See Michael C. Blumm & Sherry L. Bosse, Norton v. SUWA and the
Unraveling of Federal Public Land Planning, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 105,
123–41 (2007) (discussing Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004));
Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 689, 710–19 (1990) (discussing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)).
273. Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion
in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1671 (2012).
274. See Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive
Regulation, and the Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1705–15
(2008).
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in the future industry faced a choice between a tailored climate law and
a revival of climate-related actions under earlier laws like the Clean Air
Act that are not tailored to climate’s particular attributes, industry
might favor a more tailored, effective and likely less costly federal
climate bill. Hence, the mere retained possibility of state regulation
creates incentives for greater commitment to the successful
implementation of a federal law, be it in climate legislation or
regulation under broader existing laws.
C. Anticipating Overinclusion Risks
Efforts to preempt state and local climate efforts would actually be
difficult to accomplish and would unsettle linked markets. Given the
ubiquity of GHG emissions and the existence of other linked risks and
harms of those GHGs or co-pollutants, it would be difficult to identify
and distinguish legitimate versus preempted state and local
regulation.275 GHGs are seldom regulated just for their climate effects.
Either they cause other harms, are emitted with other co-pollutants, or
might be regulated to achieve other state goals.276 For example, energy
conservation might be motivated by a desire to reduce rate hikes, attack
other pollution harms, or reduce power plants’ use of vast amounts of
water, not to address climate change.
Broad preemptive language could lead to litigation challenging
state regulation that, in effect, imposed burdens on emitters complying
with federal climate law. Industry would make conflict preemption
claims, especially under ‘obstacle’ preemption case law since any stateimposed burdens might undercut federal cost-effectiveness goals.277
Resulting uncertainty about the scope of preemption would create
market uncertainty.
Although a familiar refrain in preemption battles, the anti“patchwork” and “fifty different states” arguments of industry favoring
a unitary preemptive climate regime in 2009 and 2010 both sought too
much and disregarded how the largest emitters of GHGs are actually
regulated. The very ubiquity of GHG sources undercuts this argument.
With a huge diversity of sources, and thousands of types of regulation
directly or indirectly influencing GHG emission levels, a truly

275. Kaswan, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
276. U.S. EPA, supra note 81, extensively analyzed such co-pollutants risks
and benefits of emissions reductions and reductions in reliance on fossil fuels.
277. See Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption by Inaction, in
PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 5, at 182–83; Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism
Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2190–91 (2009);
Buzbee, supra note 69, at 1545–46.
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preemptive federal law trying to prohibit all state regulation of GHG
emissions could have a massive disabling effect on the states and
agencies. Such a broad preemption campaign would even impinge on
traditional state turf like energy utility rate regulation and management
of water use and supply. It is hard to imagine that such massive
preemption of state and federal power to address other ills would be
anyone’s goal.
The anti-patchwork arguments also are misdirected, at least when
one considers how large stationary sources of GHG pollution are
actually regulated. First, most energy utilities are subject to
individualized state regulatory oversight for anti-monopoly and
consumer protection reasons.278 In fact, the same power company
operating in different states will already predictably face different
regulatory regimes and attitudes.279 Second, because federal emission
standards set only a regulatory floor, states and local governments have
long been able to require greater pollution reductions.280 State
Implementation Plan (SIP) efforts under the Clean Air Act also allow
states and their cities to allocate burdens among pollution sources as
they devise strategies to attain or make progress towards National
Ambient Air Quality Standards.281
Third, apart from obligations imposed under a SIP, any large
stationary source’s regulatory compliance obligations are typically
individualized and linked to its size, age, production techniques, and
many other variables.282 Individualized source obligations also exist
under the Clean Air Act’s New Source Review program, where
limitations for new or modified sources are set on a permit-by-permit
basis based on referenced best performers or most stringent limitations
imposed on other sources.283 Thus, both within and among states, large
pollution sources already face individualized regulation imposing a
variety of obligations.

278. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 60, at 822–24.
279. See id.
280. Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 3, at 1564–68.
281. States fight hard to remain in attainment and avoid unfavorable
nonattainment treatment and possible loss of federal highway dollars, plus federal
regulators themselves are reluctant to retake a delegated program from a state. Ellen
R. Zahren, Overfiling Under Federalism: Nipping at State Heels to Protect the
Environment, 49 EMORY L.J. 373, 415–18 (2000) (discussing and citing sources
discussing state and federal resistance to state loss of delegated program authority).
282. For example, even under New Source Performance Standards under Clean
Air Act Section 111(b)(2), promulgated regulations typically allow if not require
obligations tailored to “classes, types, and sizes” of regulated categories of polluters.
42 U.S.C § 7411(b)(2) (2012).
283. Buzbee, supra note 176, at 54–55.
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D. Entrenching Climate Progress Through a Web of Regulatory
Authority
This Article started with a more general and theoretical discussion
of the dynamics and values of federalism hedging. This section further
explores the important role of regulatory entrenchment, illustrated with
reference to the particular attributes of climate change and climate
regulatory battles.
Somewhat counterintuitively, allowing for the possibility of
federal, state and local climate regulation, and even different cap-andtrade regimes, could provide greater market stability and rewards for
clean energy and climate-linked investments than under an exclusively
federal regime, even if such laws cause some increase in transaction
costs and reduce economies of scale.284 Of course, if a perfectly crafted,
stable, and enforced federal carbon cap-and-trade market existed, then
the need for other regulatory actors would be greatly reduced. But such
stability and invulnerability to regulatory reversals can never be
assumed and is unlikely, for reasons discussed above.
Diffused and diverse regulatory authority would provide
substantial benefits in a real world where climate regulation
imperfection, opposition, and instability are a near certainty. Enriching
Part I’s explanation of federalism hedging by linking it here to political
science and political economic scholarship, this section’s discussion
builds on several interrelated observations and theories about the
political and economic dynamics of legislation and regulation leading to
policy entrenchment.
The tendency of law and regulation to become entrenched and
resistant to change is often noted as a problem since rigid and
prescriptive regulation can create little inducement for ongoing
improvement or updating.285 However, where a regulatory challenge is
pervaded by shared fears that regulatory commitments will prove
unstable or unmatched by other jurisdictions, a central task is to balance
the need for ongoing governmental and private sector learning and
adjustment with regulatory frameworks that are nonetheless stable and
widely embraced. Professor Patashnik therefore suggests the use of
cap-and-trade regulation of GHG emissions due to how that regulatory
tool would shape incentives and possibly ‘create a business

284. Andrew H. Van de Ven, Central Problems in the Management of
Innovation, 32 MGMT. SCI. 590, 600 (1986) (noting that redundancy can sometimes
increase innovation).
285. See COGLIANESE & D’AMBROSIO, supra note 111, at 1423–25 (articulating
arguments against state-level climate regulation and noting ‘lock-in’ risks).
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constituency’ supportive of regulation.286 Professor Lazarus similarly
proposes legislation “pre-commitment” strategies that would discourage
easy legislative reversals.287 Professors Stewart, Biber, and Brewster
each note that regulatory progress at the state level creates interest
groups invested in that regulation.288 Professors Engel and Adelman
analyze how fostering technological innovation is an independent
grounds for retaining state climate regulatory authority.289
The soundness of these observations is especially evident when one
focuses on regulatory derailment risks, associated market instability,
and how the retained possibility of state climate regulation—even if
little used—changes political and legal dynamics.
Retaining federal plus state regulatory authority facilitates the
spread and tailoring of regulatory strategies via “policy diffusion”
dynamics analyzed in political science scholarship.290 Policy diffusion
occurs when a jurisdiction’s policy ideas or regulatory actions move to
other jurisdictions, which either adopt similar measures or often tailor
them for the latter jurisdiction’s context. Innovations inherently mean a
degree of difference among jurisdictions, thus reducing economies of
scale, but policy diffusion still results in the spread of similarly focused
bodies of regulation. Innovations can diffuse through numerous actors
and in vertical (federal-state) or horizontal (state-state) directions or
through other institutional arrangements and expert actors.291
However, although political scientists analyze when and why
jurisdictions follow and learn from each other, sequentially improving
286. PATASHNIK, supra note 14, at 179.
287. Lazarus, supra note 13.
288. See Stewart, supra note 5; Biber, supra note 5; Brewster, supra note 5.
289. David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Environmental
Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 5, at 277, 293, 296–99; David E.
Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce
Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835 (2008).
290. Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion,
52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 840, 843 (2008). See also Andrew Karch, Policy Diffusion and
Climate-Change Policy, in NAVIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: THE OPPORTUNITIES
OF FEDERALISM 103 (Edella C. Schlager et al. eds., 2011). For more recent application
of diffusion literature to climate change, see Boyd & Carlson, supra note 59; Iterative
Federalism, supra note 5 (not citing diffusion literature but describing state-state and
state-federal policy learning). Benjamin Sovacool describes such climate policy
spreading as “positive contagion.” Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds:
Environmental Federalism and the Need for Federal Action on Renewable Energy and
Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 436–39 (2008).
291. See Farber, supra note 133, at 362, 373, 375–76 (analyzing how measures
to reduce GHG emission can spread through “positive spillover effects” and a “virtuous
cycle” that is “mutually reinforcing”); but see Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Islands,
89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 166 (2014) (analyzing challenges to dissemination of regulatory
innovations).
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similar regulation, an additional benefit of diffused policy innovations
to market actors is neglected but illuminated by this climate and clean
energy policy case study. Innovations will lead to some difference. So,
for example, strategies to incentivize distributed solar investment, or
reward demand reductions, or other energy efficiency measures might
vary.
Nevertheless, the critical point here is that the spread of similarly
targeted regulation means that, overall, more and more jurisdictions
would be invested in a regulatory field to achieve a shared goal. From
the perspective of private market actors, diffused but similarly targeted
regulation can result in a web of regulation that in aggregate creates
stable policy and resulting markets, even if some variety among
jurisdictions remains. For the inventor of, for example, new energy
storage technology, new high-efficiency solar energy technologies, an
energy-efficient appliance, or other means to reduce carbon emissions
resulting from energy production, the existence of many jurisdictions
driving markets for such products will maintain incentives for
investment, even with regulatory variety. Ongoing state and business
interest in clean energy progress and reductions in GHG emissions even
during periods of federal reversal provide an example of how aggregate
demand from disparate but similarly targeted regulation can serve to
maintain business progress and also reduce resistance to regulation.292
Furthermore, every time a jurisdiction tailors its adoption of a
diffused policy to its own distinctive needs, attributes, and resources, it
provides three benefits. First, that tailoring reduces the costs of
adoption and, unless the jurisdiction is irrational, would also maximize
local benefits. Incremental regulatory innovations can teach other states
and federal regulators, and the demonstration that regulation and linked
businesses really are both viable can also change federal regulatory and
legislative dynamics.293 States really can serve as “laboratories of
democracy.”294 Second, every regulatory tweak and adjustment may
open new market opportunities and reduce the costs borne by later
following jurisdictions. Hence, regulatory costs would tend to drop,
benefits increase, and sequential learning and regulatory and market

292. See supra notes 194–232 and accompanying text (linking federal and state
policy progress and increasingly cost competitive clean energy businesses).
293. See Iterative Federalism, supra note 5, at 1101, 1109; DeShazo &
Freeman, supra note 75, at 1533–36; Farber, supra note 133, at 375–76.
294. See Sovacool, supra note 290, at 430; but see Brain Galle & Joseph
Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments,
58 EMORY L.J. 1333 (2009) (critiquing the theory that states function as policy
laboratories).
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innovations would follow.295 Again and again, despite industry
predictions that new regulation in a wide array of fields would impose
massive regulatory compliance costs on them, actual compliance costs
have been far more modest.296
The third benefit relates in a somewhat paradoxical way to the
same dynamics that can drive race-to-the-bottom environmental
concerns. States will inevitably compete against each other to attract
businesses and their attendant employment and tax benefits.297 They will
also seek to grow and retain businesses linked to their particular
economies, universities, research and development facilities, and other
endowments. That diversity of endowments, aspirations, and political
environments is likely to generate a different mix of policy initiatives.
That competitive state hunt for the next big industry, or technological
breakthrough, is inherently a hunt for relative advantage. That some
states would not want to be regulatory innovators or do more than the
federal government does not matter; all it takes is a state innovator or
business leader to demonstrate new means to further regulatory ends.
For example, states with businesses heavily invested in carbon offset
activities would likely face interest group pressure to reward such
climate change-fighting strategies even if the federal impetus weakened
or disappeared.298
The experience of state brownfield law innovations when the
United State federal Superfund law proved dysfunctional provides an
important analogous lesson.299 The federal Superfund law frustrated
both private sector and state and local goals due to potentially vast and
uncertain cleanup liabilities.300 States came up with improvements to
reduce this uncertainty and encourage investment in former industrial
sites known as brownfields, and other states learned and imitated.301
295. Professor McAllister reviews the tendency of pollution reductions to be
far easier and cheaper than threatened by regulatory opponents. See McAllister, supra
note 250.
296. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM: THE LASTING LEGACY OF
THE LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL (2013) (reviewing and questioning claims of disastrous
regulatory burdens as part of anti-regulatory rhetoric and movement); McAllister, supra
note 250 (same).
297. See Engel, supra note 29, at 304–05 (showing through survey how
jurisdictions compete for business investment).
298. See Boyd & Salzman, supra note 61, at 78 (discussing forest-related
offsets and linked regulatory activity).
299. For recounting and analyses of this paragraph’s brownfields legal history,
see Contextual Environmental Federalism, supra note 3, at 119–21; Heidi Gorovitz
Robertson, Legislative Innovation in State Brownfields Redevelopment Programs, 16 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 11–15 (2001); Revesz, supra note 53, at 598–03.
300. Revesz, supra note 53, at 594–95, 600.
301. Id. at 600–02; Roberston, supra note 299, at 1–3.
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The federal government through regulatory measures then imitated the
states and sought to reduce the harshness and liability uncertainty under
the law.302 Ultimately, a federal legislative amendment encouraging
brownfields reuse was enacted that modeled improvements on those
state innovations and interim federal regulatory measures.303
Similarly, retained state latitude in the climate and clean energy
areas for such incremental improvement, experimentation, and
innovation has been critical to climate progress and provided the
underpinning of the CPP.304 Years of climate and clean energy
regulation at the state level, assisted by an array of other state and
federal tax and financial incentives, created constituencies invested in
and supportive of the flexible and market-based and trading-friendly
CPP.
As seen with the CPP, as each state creates regulation that in turn
fosters linked private investment, private and public constituencies will
arise that are invested in that regulation and linked market. Those
invested in the status quo have incentives to oppose its wholesale
abandonment.305 A federal policy that precluded or hindered such state
differences, however, could derail such a balance of beneficial
innovation and a collectively large aggregate web of regulation
supporting business investment.
When one starts to compare a single preemptive federal climate
regime and a regime that embraces diffused authority with latitude for
state difference and change, the benefits of non-preemptive regimes
become especially apparent. Federalism-facilitated policy diffusion ends
up looking much like the “learning by monitoring,” benchmarking and
“experimentalist” learning touted for many settings by Charles Sabel
and other scholars working with his concepts, as well as the functioning
of adaptive systems.306 Regulatory interactions and sequential
302. Revesz, supra note 53, at 594–95, 602–03.
303. Contextual Environmental Federalism, supra note 3, at 120.
304. Kaswan, supra note 4 at 67, 69.
305. See Biber, supra note 5, at 411–16.
306. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 287–88 (1998) (arguing for
benefits of continuous generation of new information and adjustment and improvement
in an array of legal areas); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering in the
Age of Collaboration, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 555, 567–71 (2002) (discussing “collaborative
ecosystem management” and the room it leaves for regionally tailored solutions with
broad coordination and public accountability); Bradley C. Karkkainen, ‘New
Governance’ in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to
Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471 (2004) (discussing similar legal
innovations known by the ‘new governance’ label and related approaches to
governance); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 396, 461 (2004)
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improvements, coupled with the benefits of responsive businesses
developing products and services, have led to ongoing innovations and
rapid progress, not the sort of frozen regulation criticized by Sabel.
Relatedly, scholarship on “path dependence” and “increasing
returns” or increasing “costs of exit,” mostly from political science
scholarship, similarly reveals how retaining state climate authority can
over time increase investment in and commitment to what may still be
an ever-changing status quo.307 As similarly directed policy initiatives
are embraced in multiple jurisdictions, policymakers and dependent
businesses and individuals will resist change that undercuts that
investment.308 Time and changing increased investments create a path
that is hard to abandon.309
This observation links closely to scholarship on legislative
dynamics: any legislation, or even authoritative interpretation of
legislation by an agency or court, will lead to investment in that new
status quo and create political opposition to change.310 Again, each step
down the legal path creates greater and broader sequential lock-in of
interests, thereby changing incentives. Even the growing body of
behavioral economics observes a similar tendency at the individual
level; people become attached to the status quo. Individuals hence may
initially resist changes wrought by regulation, but once they start to
adjust to a new normal, they may resist a return to the old ways or at
least form new attachments.311 Many state and business CPP supporters
fought for the regulatory program due to how it would integrate and
preserve such investments.312
From the viewpoint of private market actors, an additional crucial
insight is that universal change or deregulation is harder to achieve with
diffused policy authority; multiple veto players would need to be
overcome.313 Ongoing clean energy momentum in many states despite
(discussing similar legal innovations and methods of governance); see also AYRES &
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 12 (exploring similar issues).
307. See Biber, supra note 5, at 402–03, 434–40; Brewster, supra note 5, at
250–51, 263–64, Pierson supra note 15, at 251–56, 263–64.
308. Pierson, supra note 15, at 252–55.
309. Id. at 252.
310. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 12–22 (2010); William N. Eskridge, Interpreting
Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 99, 114 (1988). See also Mathew D.
McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Superstatutory Entrenchment: A Positive and
Normative Interrogatory, 120 YALE L.J. 387, 395–401 (2011).
311. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Climate Change, 2000 ILL.
L. REV. 299, 307–08.
312. See supra notes 241–49 and accompanying text.
313. See, e.g., Josephine T. Andrews & Gabriella R. Montinola, Veto Players
and the Rule of Law in Emerging Democracies, 37 COMP. POL. STUD. 55, 56–59
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federal setbacks or inertia illustrates the benefits of concurrent state
regulatory authority.314 States face different political dynamics than do
federal legislators or the president.
Federal derailment hence indicates little about the fate of statelevel efforts to reverse climate and clean energy regulation. This is in
part due to the political reality that respect for federalism and state
policy turf is itself a politically salient policy choice; even if a politician
might dislike a federal law providing, for example, clean energy
incentives, preempting similar state-level efforts would have to
overcome both supporters of the energy incentives and supporters of
state policy independence under federalism principles.315 In addition,
the linkage of GHG emissions and energy production make preemption
of such state regulation close to impossible to design. As a matter of
coalitional politics, adding such anti-state provisions would engender
opposition.
Furthermore, consideration of legislative inertia and status quo
dynamics further reveals benefits of federal law retaining overlapping
state and federal authority for a regulatory challenge like climate
change. Legislative inertia would work in favor of retaining those state
roles even during a period of regulatory recoil. Interests seeking to
derail climate efforts would not only have to derail federal
implementation or repeal a federal climate law, but also gain
supermajority support of federal legislators to disempower the states
and unsettle bargains struck under other laws.316 Or they would have to
battle in state after state to preclude state and local climate regulation.
But federalism politics are far more complicated and less predictable
along party lines than are pro-environmental or anti-environmental
lines, or pro-climate or anti-climate legislation lines. 317

(2004); George Tsebelis & Eric C. Chang, Veto Players and the Structure of Budgets in
Advanced Industrialized Countries, 43 EUR. J. POL. RES. 449, 449–50 (2004). See also
Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J.
795, 809–10, 813 (2005) (discussing implications of diffused, divided, and fragmented
authority).
314. See supra Section III.D.
315. See SCHAPIRO, supra note 43, at 97–107 (discussing values and
instrumental benefits associated with federalism).
316. See Ahdieh, supra note 49, at 866 (2006) (noting that environmental law
is prime example of “intersystemic regulation”); Robert A. Schapiro & William W.
Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause
Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1246–47 (2003).
317. Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New Blue
Federalism, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV., Winter 2009, at 33, 33–42; Barry G. Rabe et al.,
State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 1, 2–8 (2005); Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global
Environmental Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 749–50 (1999) (noting that existing
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A diffused regulatory environment retaining roles for federal and
state regulators is akin to a fabric with many different threads providing
strength. To destroy that web of laws would require many successful
political attacks. In contrast, if all climate regulatory authority rested on
a single federal law, then intense federal lobbying, a sympathetic
president, or a slow or lax federal regulator could result in complete
destruction of the single thread supporting climate regulation that, in
turn, would no longer be there to undergird linked business investment.
E. Entrenchment and the Tax Versus Cap-and-Trade Choice
Throughout this Article’s exploration of federalism hedging and
the climate change case study, regulation via a cap-and-trade program
has generally been assumed. The other market-based regulatory
strategy favored by economists and periodically revived by
policymakers, most recently in the 2017 tax-and-dividend proposal,318 is
to deter harmful conduct through the use of Pigouvian taxes.319 If a
price is affixed to each unit of carbon, incentives would exist to reduce
pollution.320 Large carbon emitters would be disfavored in the market
and benefits would flow either to pollution reduction techniques or to
other market actors able to provide the good (be it energy or a product)
at a lower carbon cost. Tax-induced development of viable means to
reduce GHG emissions or energy use could help with regulatory
stability.321
However, when examined from a perspective focused on the
stability of the regulatory regime and linked markets, tax-based
strategies appear less likely than cap-and-trade schemes to create the
invested constituencies that would fight against implementation failures
and policy reversal. A carbon tax would create less path-dependent

theory for environmental regulation lacks “a convincing account” that is “even more
murky at the global level”).
318. BAKER, III ET AL., supra note 114, at 1.
319. Thomas Merrill & David M. Schizer, Energy Policy for an Economic
Downturn: A Proposed Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 1,
4 (2010).
320. A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172–203 (4th ed. 1932). See
also WILLIAM H. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 21–23, 29 (2d ed. 1988).
321. As Jim Rossi observes, regulation itself can function like a carbon tax,
and already does in the modern energy regulation, but could be designed to be more
effective. Jim Rossi, Carbon Taxation by Regulation, 102 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018)
(working
paper
no.
17-31),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2937783
[https://perma.cc/D2PD-JPL8].
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increasing returns or high costs of exit.322 After all, a tax involves little
ongoing investment in and commitment to that regulatory regime. A tax
can go away in a year or two with little disruption. Few if any entities
would literally be invested in a carbon tax scheme.
In contrast, a cap-and-trade regime, especially if it included offset
credit rewards, would immediately create a host of businesses and
perhaps governments here and abroad that would be substantially
invested in the value of their carbon allowances or offset credits.
Trading markets would create yet another source of wealth and
regulatory entrenchment.323 Thus, from the perspective of businesses
and other jurisdictions looking for signals of dependable climate
commitments, a tax-based strategy might provide little reassurance.
However, as analyzed by David Driesen, a carbon tax might “play
more nicely” with complementary policies than a trading regime, plus
would create an ongoing incentive for pollution reductions.324 And
political viability of course matters. Hence, which market-based tool—a
carbon tax or cap and trade regime—would, in the end, be most
effective involves an array of variables beyond this Article’s focus on
federalism hedging and entrenchment.
If a carbon tax became the preferred regulatory instrument to
reduce GHG emissions, policymakers attending to regulatory stability
concerns would need to create highly motivated supportive
constituencies. The 2017 cap-and-dividend proposal, for example,
proposed to put carbon tax revenues directly into taxpayers’ pockets,
much as a substantial portion of Alaska’s oil revenue is allocated to its
citizens.325 Such a design might over time entrench policy reducing
GHG emissions and hence reduce risks of regulatory reversal.
Nonetheless, for the same reasons identified above, a preemptive
federal carbon tax proposal could be set at the wrong level, be poorly
implemented, or could later be abandoned. If preemptive of
complementary state regulation, such a law could lead to a regulatory
vacuum.
F. Climate Federalism Clarity and the Constitutional and Statutory
Minefield
Rounded analysis of federalism hedging and the climate challenge
requires a brief foray into doctrinal analysis. Whatever the federalism
322.
323.
324.
325.
proposal).

See Pierson, supra note 15, at 252–54, 257–61, and accompanying text.
Stavins, supra note 69, at 298–99.
Driesen, supra note 253, at 23–29.
See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text (summarizing this
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and preemption mix ultimately adopted to address climate change,
encourage clean energy, or address another regulatory challenge,
federal statutory language about federalism must be clear and explicit to
avoid regulatory and market uncertainty.
Even if a new federal climate-targeted law remains elusive, a
modest statutory amendment to either federal environmental laws,
energy laws, or a freestanding enactment addressing state climate and
clean energy regulatory authority would help ensure that state and
regional clean energy and climate regulation efforts do not run afoul of
federal statutory law or face dormant Commerce Clause challenges.
Current state and regional efforts are already imperiled by preemption
and constitutional challenges.326 Such arguable infirmities arise due to
state efforts to take responsibility for reducing their jurisdiction’s own
emissions, reduce compliance costs by embracing cross-state and even
international trading options, and, especially, ensure that their
regulation does not simply result in the transfer of energy production or
leakage of GHG emissions to other jurisdictions.
A raft of judicial rejections and some limited successes confirm the
need for explicit and effective statutory drafting. For example, even if
well-intentioned, state barriers to the interstate movement of business
activity and energy can violate FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction over
interstate and wholesale energy markets, as the Supreme Court found in
2016 in striking down a Maryland law that sought to incentivize
construction of clean energy production.327 Under somewhat
distinguishable programs, state clean energy strategies in California and
Minnesota were challenged on both statutory and constitutional
grounds. California’s program to assess fees based on climate impacts
of fuel transportation was upheld in a decision focused on dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine.328 Minnesota’s limitation on importation of
energy from out-of-state generators was rejected, but with the three
appellate judges dividing on the underlying rationale.329 Other energy
and climate-linked measures also have met with judicial rejection due to

326. Steven Ferrey, Solving the Multimillion Dollar Constitutional Puzzle
Surrounding State “Sustainable” Energy Policy, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 121, 121–
28, 135–47 (2014) (identifying constitutional and statutory infirmities of many state
clean energy and climate regulatory regimes and suggesting means to eliminate such
risks); Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 1621, 1651–72 (2008) (same, with special focus on possible challenges to state
trading regimes linked to foreign nations and dormant Commerce Clause).
327. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1298–99 (2016).
328. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Carey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1102–03 (9th
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014).
329. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 922–23, 927–29 (8th Cir.
2016).
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preemption. For example, municipal measures to improve the energy
efficiency of buildings were found by a district court to be preempted
under a federal law setting uniform appliance efficiency standards.330
The Supreme Court’s construction of the Clean Air Act’s most
preemptive provision further creates federalism and preemption
uncertainties. In the Engine Manufacturers331 case, despite the Clean
Air Act’s savings clause and State Implementation Plan provisions, the
Supreme Court rejected local measures mandating clean motor vehicle
fleets.332 Such measures were held preempted by the Clean Air Act
provision setting forth a national emissions standard for new motor
vehicles, subject only to a carve-out for California; the Court declined
to limit the reach of the law’s preemptive language to regulation
directed at manufacturers.333 The Court held that the law also
preempted state and local regulation targeting motor vehicle purchase
choices.334
Efforts by municipalities to require clean taxicab fleets have been
similarly rejected in the lower courts.335 And when New York sought to
preclude trades of power plant pollution that would result in increased
Midwestern power plant pollution that would drift back to New York,
the Second Circuit found that such regulation illegally frustrated the
Clean Air Act’s acid rain trading program’s goals of a cost-effective
freely operating market in sulfur dioxide allowances.336
Because so many activities and categories of regulation link to
energy usage and GHG emissions, little state or local regulation is sure
to avoid conflict with current federal laws or future climate-directed
legislation or regulation. And if such a future federal climate law or
regulation were to adopt market-based modes of regulation or in other
respects seek cost-effective regulation or even just provide incentives
for desired innovations, any additional state and local regulation could

330. Air Conditioning, Heating and Refrigeration Inst. v. City of Albuquerque,
835 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1140 (D.N.M. 2010).
331. Engine Mfrs. Assoc. v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246
(2004).
332. Id. at 258–59.
333. Id. at 249–55.
334. Id. at 255, 258.
335. See, e.g., Ophir v. City of Bos., 647 F. Supp. 2d 86, 87–88, 94 (D.
Mass. 2009); Metro Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. N.Y.C., 615 F. 3d. 152, 154, 158 (2d Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1264 (2011).
336. Clean Air Markets Group v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82, 87–89 (2d Cir. 2003).
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be viewed as posing an obstacle to those market-facilitating and costeffectiveness goals.337
Two main strategies could avoid constitutional and statutory
challenges to state and local efforts to produce cleaner energy and limit
GHG emission. The first option is for Congress or agencies to provide
careful articulation of categories of permissible activity. Explicit
statutory permission can overcome both statutory preemption concerns
and dormant Commerce Clause infirmities. However, due to the
massive variety of government choices and actions influencing energy
usage and GHG emissions, comprehensive express carve-outs from
conflict preemption risks would be difficult to craft.
A better or perhaps accompanying option would be to create a
regulatory or adjudicatory regime that would protect state and local
climate and energy efficiency regulation unless stakeholders in agency
or judicial venues established that such state and local measures posed a
substantial obstacle to federal ends.338 Preemption doctrine may already
be moving in the direction of assessing actual evidence of undue state
frustration of federal ends.339 Courts should not find obstacle
preemption without assessment of the magnitude of the conflict, state
and local motivations, and consideration of other benefits of such state
and local regulation, including horizontal and vertical learning about
the efficacy of alternative regulatory options.340
CONCLUSION
Monopolies are always problematic. In debates over the content of
ideal federal climate legislation or regulation, prominent scholarly,
political, and industry advocates have argued for preemption of state

337. See Buzbee, supra note 69, at 1553–61, 1572 (observing emergence of
“preemption hard look review” under which courts examine the factual underpinnings
of claimed preempted conflicts).
338. Michael Burger similarly suggests a regime favoring state and local
authority, but still subject to a regulatory review process, using the Coastal Zone
Management Act as an instructive analog. Michael Burger, Empowering Local
Autonomy and Encouraging Experimentation in Climate Change Governance: The Case
for a Layered Regime, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 11161, 11170–71 (2009).
339. See Buzbee, supra note 69, at 1553–61, 1572 (noting preemption law shift
toward a mode of review akin to administrative law “hard look review” in assessing the
reality of claimed obstacles); Sharkey, supra note 277, at 2130–31 (arguing for more
rigorous judicial review of claims of preempted obstacles posed by state and local
regulation).
340. See Burger, supra note 338, at 11169 (criticizing courts addressing
environmental setting obstacle preemption claims for failing to assess “actual
impact[s],” federal and state planning, and “the devolutionary values” such efforts
represent).
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climate regulatory authority. Such arguments fail to consider the
beneficial dynamics created by what this Article labels federalism
hedging. Despite the intuitive appeal of a preemptive single market
structure for a worldwide problem that would benefit from marketbased regulation at the largest scale possible, a preemptive regime
could create incentives for strategic reversal efforts or actions to derail
legal implementation. This nation’s progress would be almost
completely dependent on a federal regulatory monopoly and a single
law.
As with other regulatory challenges characterized by rapid change,
innovation, and turbulent politics, retaining state and local climate
authority both intertwined with and possibly independent from federal
climate regulation would create a more sturdy and resilient web of
regulation, stabilize linked markets, and discourage efforts to derail a
federal climate law. The mere possibility of more state regulation
would create heightened incentives for successful federal regulation that
would, in turn, reduce potentially disparate state measures. With more
regulatory stability, market rewards for innovation would also be
enhanced.
Federal climate preemption and unitary regulatory scheme
arguments may make sense in an idealized world of perfect, stable legal
commitments, but in a real world pervaded by regulatory failure,
reversal risks, and political instability, such unitary preemptive regimes
would undercut climate progress. The more federal climate regulation
or future legislation uses preemptive strategies, the more all hopes for
climate progress would rest on one imperfect and vulnerable federal
vessel. Retaining room for state and local climate regulation and linked
clean energy efforts hedges regulatory risks. Such overlapping and
potentially intertwined federal and state regulation may, somewhat
paradoxically, be the most effective way to ensure that a future federal
climate law or regulation under existing law will actually be
implemented and endure despite ongoing political and legal
contestation.
In the meantime, during times of federal policy reversal or inertia,
the enduring norm of room for additional state regulation and
innovation remains important. States, alongside intermittent federal
progress and policy support, have been critical to climate and clean
energy progress and in catalyzing federal climate engagement. During a
period of federal recoil, states will again likely become the main vessel
for climate momentum and in rewarding clean energy innovation.
Through that retained and ongoing state authority, the pressure will
build for federal reengagement. Through the benefits of federalism
hedging, climate progress may slow but is unlikely to cease.

